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Introduction 
The traditional model of contract interpretation focuses on the “meeting 
of the minds.” Parties agree on how to structure their respective obligations 
and rights and then specify their agreement in a written document. Gaps and 
ambiguities are inevitable. But where contract language exists for the point 
in contention and a dispute arises as to the meaning of this language, courts 
attempt to divine what the parties intended. Among the justifications for 
deferring to the intent of the parties is the assumption that parties know what 
is best for themselves.1 Deference also arguably furthers autonomy values. 
Not all contracts and contract terms are individually negotiated. Stan-
dard-form or boilerplate contracts are common in the commercial world. 
Standard-form contracts have received considerable attention from commen-
tators.2 The focus has been on the problem of power and informational 
asymmetries among the contracting parties. One party dictates the terms—
for example, a big consumer-goods producer may draft a standard-form con-
tract that forms a mandatory part of all consumer purchases. 
Boilerplate contracts, however, are found in many markets where the re-
lationship between the parties is not characterized by power imbalances. 
Instead, we find sophisticated parties on both sides and a multitude of par-
ties with their slight variations on the same set of boilerplate terms. Large 
portions of the markets for bonds and derivatives are dominated by boiler-
plate of this type. Our goal is to suggest that the interpretation of boilerplate 
contracts among sophisticated parties is a topic in need of attention.3 We 
contend that general principles of contract interpretation should not apply to 
this important subset of commercial contracts and make the case that these 
contracts are better viewed as akin to statutes. 
A handful of courts have taken modified interpretive approaches, recog-
nizing the special nature of boilerplate contracts in markets consisting of 
sophisticated parties. These courts have recognized that uniformity in the 
interpretation of this language is important because it enables the underlying 
financial instruments to be priced and traded. Such courts have adhered 
strictly to the textual language of the contract,4 displayed a reluctance to 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 
113 Yale L.J. 541, 618 (2003) (arguing that the principle of deferring to party intent applies 
strongly in the case of sophisticated commercial transactors). 
 2. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. 
Rev. 679; Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 
Colum. L. Rev. 629, 631 (1943); K.N. Llewellyn, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700 (1939) (book review); W. 
David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. 
L. Rev. 529, 530 (1971). 
 3. Little economic analysis exists on contract interpretation. See Richard A. Posner, The 
Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1581, 1581 (2005). Alan Schwartz 
and Robert Scott undertake an examination of how courts should interpret the contracts of sophisti-
cated commercial parties. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1. 
 4. See Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 947 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The Fifth 
Circuit found the disputed contract language unambiguous even though (a) a prior panel had found 
the language ambiguous and, (b) there was evidence of significant differences of opinion among 
expert lawyers (and not just the litigators) as to the meaning of the language. Id. at 932–40, 955. The 
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imply good faith duties,5 and applied judge-made analysis of the economic 
interests of the parties where the contractual language is undeniably am-
biguous.6 Courts have also applied deference to prior court interpretations of 
the same language (assuming that if the market had had a problem with the 
prior court interpretation, the market would have corrected the language).7 
Courts are right in recognizing the need for uniformity in markets that 
use boilerplate. We part company with them in terms of strategies that will 
promote uniformity, such as the preference for textualism and the willing-
ness to defer to prior court interpretations. Over time, slight mutations in the 
precise language that different actors have in their contracts often emerge8—
mutations which may not have any particular meaning for the contracting 
parties and that a court taking a textualist approach may attach too great 
weight. Different boilerplate terms may get cobbled together in the same 
contract, leading to potential inconsistencies when interpreted through a 
purely textualist approach. The chance for court error in interpreting boiler-
plate is therefore high.  
Rather than have courts attempt the error-prone process of determining 
what would be in the parties’ best interests, we argue that courts should take 
a more statutory approach to interpreting boilerplate terms. Specifically, 
courts should look to the intent of the original drafters of the terms, much 
like courts look to legislative intent in interpreting statutes. In discerning 
this intent, the court may need to look to the overall history of a term, the 
process by which the term became a standard (or one of the standards) in the 
industry, and its context within the greater commercial environment.  
Like the textualists, we argue that courts should not make an inquiry into 
the actual intent of a specific set of contracting parties (or try to divine the 
hypothetical bargain that the parties might have wanted to strike). Boiler-
plate terms, absent guidance from the initial drafters of the terms or other 
market standard setters, inevitably will become less clear over time. As par-
ties include boilerplate terms drafted years if not decades earlier as a matter 
of course, looking to the specific intent of any one set of current contracting 
                                                                                                                      
court explained that finding the language ambiguous would result in an investigation into party 
intentions that would be detrimental for at least two reasons: (a) it would produce variation in the 
understanding of a term that the market wanted a standardized understanding of, and (b) the boiler-
plate nature of these clauses meant that the parties probably hadn’t negotiated them which, in turn, 
meant that investigating party intentions would be pointless. Id. at 947 n.20; see also Leverso v. 
SouthTrust Bank of Ala., 18 F.3d 1527, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994); U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Alpert, 10 F. 
Supp. 2d 290, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880–82 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
 5. CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) v. Banco Cent. do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105, 1115 n.8 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1521 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989); Katz, 508 A.2d at 880–82. 
 6. E.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048–51 (2d 
Cir. 1982). 
 7. See Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1541–42 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 8. E.g. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, An Empirical Study of Securities Disclosure Practices, 
80 Tulane L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006) (describing the slight mutations that occur in the modifica-
tion and pari passu clauses for Colombia, China, and Italy over the 1985–2005 period) (draft on file 
with authors). 
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(and litigating) parties becomes meaningless. The lack of meaning would 
not be a problem if such terms were merely benign appendices to a contract. 
However, as in the case of the pari passu clause for sovereign bond agree-
ments we discuss in this Article, boilerplate terms may take on unexpected 
meanings that radically alter the distribution of rights and duties among con-
tracting parties.  
Deference to the intentions of the specific parties before a court is espe-
cially inappropriate where there are third party effects.9 In the contexts on 
which we focus, an interpretation of the contract language in one case will 
impact the contracts for a multitude of other parties who all have essentially 
the same boilerplate language in their contracts. Deferring to the intentions 
of the parties to the dispute may produce problems where these parties do 
not represent the interests of the others in the market who have no say in the 
current litigation. We therefore argue that courts should not attempt to sup-
plement the explicit language of a contract with evidence from the parties’ 
course of dealings or performance as suggested under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.10 
Referring to historical meaning and the intent of the original drafters is a 
form of contextual analysis. Rather than looking at the context of the spe-
cific set of contracting parties before the court, though, our approach has 
courts looking at the context of the original drafters of the term in the case 
of boilerplate, taking a “statutory” approach to the interpretation of boiler-
plate terms. Looking to the historical context of a term, we argue, provides 
the highest probability of divining an interpretation that best maximizes the 
interests of contracting parties (and thus, approximates what the parties 
would have wanted to adopt ex ante had they focused on the particular issue 
at hand). Individually, contracting parties may choose (rationally) not to 
contract for every contingency and clarify the meaning of every term. For 
many contractual contingencies, any single set of contracting parties may 
find it too costly both to identify the exact nature of the contingency and to 
specify how the contract should deal with the contingency. Where the con-
tingency is commonly faced throughout an industry, the single set of parties 
ignores the positive external benefit to others from expending resources in 
drafting and clarifying an applicable contract term. A centralized source for 
terms, such as an industry association or attorney firm (designated a “stan-
dard setter”) that originally drafted the terms, in contrast, will have 
internalized the benefit to the group of adopters of the terms to the extent 
the standard setter profited from more adoptions when first promulgating the 
terms. Where the interests of contracting parties today are not too different 
from those at the time of the initial adoption, looking to the historical record 
                                                                                                                      
 9. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 
Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1114–15, 1182–88 (2003).  
 10. See David V. Snyder, Language and Formalities in Commercial Contracts: A Defense of 
Custom and Conduct, 54 SMU L. Rev. 617, 620–22 (2001) (describing the U.C.C.’s interpretive 
hierarchy). 
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will result in interpretations that better approximate the goals of the industry 
or trade compared with any single set of contracting parties.  
Minimizing error costs in court interpretations is particularly important 
in the case of boilerplate terms. The market faces large failures in the ability 
of dispersed participants to modify boilerplate terms effectively over time to 
take into account changing business conditions and error-prone court inter-
pretations. Dispersed parties may not coordinate to change a term after a 
court error in interpretation. Faced with the possibility that others may not 
change a term, a specific set of parties may not wish to deviate from the 
standard. Deviating, for example, may signal to the market that the parties 
are particularly litigious and, in the case of fast-paced transactions, delay a 
deal from going forward.  
Compared with courts, the original drafters of boilerplate terms—that is, 
the original standard setters—enjoy an expertise advantage and internalize 
the benefit to the range of market participants that will adopt the boiler-
plate.11 Also, deferring to historical context and the intent of the original 
drafters will induce market-based standard setters to coordinate in creating 
new, clearer terms as well as authoritative definitions and modifications to 
the existing pool of boilerplate terms. Doing so allows the standard setters 
developing the new terms to achieve “original drafter” status, thereby ob-
taining court deference to the standard setters’ interpretation for those 
parties that adopt the new terms. 
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we discuss two examples of 
boilerplate terms drawn from the sovereign bond and privately negotiated 
derivatives markets. In Part II, we explore reasons why markets may have 
trouble responding to litigation or other interpretive shocks. We set forth in 
Part III our thesis that judges should interpret commercial boilerplate con-
tracts using an analytical framework closer to statutory analysis than 
conventional contract analysis. 
I. Two Case Studies 
Contracts are negotiated in a variety of contexts and involve parties with 
varying degrees of skill and experience. We focus on the subset of contracts 
dealing with boilerplate terms in a sophisticated, commercial context. We 
provide two case studies of commercial boilerplate terms to start our discus-
sion.  
A. The Case of the Pari Passu Clause 
Perhaps the most litigated and most controversial term in the history of 
sovereign debt is the pari passu clause. This term is found in practically every 
single sovereign debt contract, whether it is a syndicated loan agreement or a 
                                                                                                                      
 11. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 
Va. L. Rev. 821, 908 n.231 (1992) (“[W]hile judges may be good surrogates for the rationally igno-
rant consumer, they are often deficient interpreters of more specialized usages of trade.”). 
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bond indenture.12 Indeed, in U.S.- and English-law-governed documents, the 
clause is considered so important that it is one of the handful of terms that 
typically gets repeated at the front of the prospectus in the summary of es-
sential terms.13 A typical formulation of the clause goes as follows: 
“The obligations of the debtor under this instrument hereunder do rank 
and will rank pari passu in priority of payment with all other External In-
debtedness of the debtor.”14 
What does that mean? In the corporate context, there is a meaning on 
which commentators agree.15 Those whose debts rank pari passu will get 
paid on an equal priority in the event of an insolvency distribution. The pari 
passu clause serves to contract around the default rule in some jurisdictions 
that otherwise gives priority to debts that are incurred earlier in time.16 What 
does the clause mean when the debtor cannot go bankrupt, as in the case of 
sovereign lenders? The leading commentators on sovereign contracts ac-
knowledged that there exists ambiguity as to the meaning of this clause.17 
The presence of ambiguity, in turn, provided an opportunity for rent seek-
ing.18  
In 2000, in Elliott Associates v. Peru,19 Elliott, a vulture fund, argued that 
the pari passu clause meant that a sovereign could not make preferential 
payments to any of its creditors whose debt ranked pari passu with the debt 
that they held. Peru had concluded a restructuring with a number of its 
                                                                                                                      
 12. This Section of the Article summarizes the research we have been doing for a separate 
article-length treatment of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt instruments. That article com-
bines both qualitative and quantitative research on both the evolution of the clause and the various 
litigations. In all, we looked at more than 250 sovereign debt contracts for over thirty countries (with 
in-depth time-series treatments of the evolutions of the clauses for twenty countries). Every single 
contract we examined, whether from a private or public deal, had a pari passu clause in it. See 
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, When Sophisticated Parties Fail To Cure Ambiguities Caused by 
a Litigation Shock: The Puzzle of the Pari Passu Case (Dec. 22, 2005) (unpublished tables and 
interview notes on file with authors). 
 13. We found this to be true in over ninety-five percent of the sovereign debt contracts in the 
database that we used for this project. When we talk about “contracts,” we are talking about the 
contract language that is reproduced in the prospectuses. We are assuming, therefore, that the pro-
spectuses are accurate when they tell us that they are reproducing the relevant contractual terms. 
Choi & Gulati, supra note 12. 
 14. See Lee C. Buchheit, How To Negotiate Eurocurrency Loan Agreements 83, 85 
(2d ed. 2000) (setting forth variations of pari passu language). 
 15. See Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt In-
struments, 53 Emory L.J. 869, 872–76 (2004) (discussing commentary on the meaning of the clause 
in the corporate context); G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 Bus. Law. 635, 
637 (2001). 
 16. See Financial Markets Law Committee, Issue 79—Pari Passu Clauses (2005) 
[hereinafter FMLC Report], available at http://www.fmlc.org/papers/fmlc79mar_2005.pdf. 
 17. See Gulati & Klee, supra note 15, at 643–64 (citing discussions by Buchheit, Wood, and 
Lowenfeld). 
 18. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strat-
egy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710, 740–42 (1999). 
 19. 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999). For a discussion of the case, see William W. Bratton, Pari 
Passu and a Distressed Sovereign’s Rational Choices, 53 Emory L.J. 823, 823–25 (2004). See also 
Gulati & Klee, supra note 15, at 635–38 (summarizing the facts behind the Elliott Associates case). 
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bondholders and was about to disburse a large payment to its European 
holders of Brady bonds via Euroclear. A Brussels court ruled, ex parte, in 
Elliott’s favor, granting an injunction against Euroclear. Peru’s government, 
with Alberto Fujimori in his final days in power, was in a precarious state, 
and did not want to be seen as defaulting on its Brady bonds. The end result 
was that Elliott got paid in full—upwards of $55 million on bonds that cost 
it approximately $11 million.20  
The ruling suddenly gave holdouts the teeth to disrupt sovereign debt re-
structurings. That sent the sovereign bond world into a tizzy, generating an 
immense volume of speeches, articles, and policy recommendations.21 De-
spite a lack of clarity as to what the pari passu clause meant in the sovereign 
context, the sovereigns and their advisers were quite adamant that the clause 
did not prohibit non-pro-rata payments to creditors under conditions of de-
fault.22 Sovereigns had always thought that they were entitled to pay their 
favored creditors on a priority basis, especially when in financial crisis.23 
The de facto priority that the official-sector lenders (the IMF, the ADB, the 
World Bank, etc.) enjoyed when lending to sovereigns in distress provided 
evidence for the sovereigns’ view.24 On the other side, the holdout creditors 
and their lawyers were equally firm. The plain language of the clause al-
lowed for only one sensible meaning, they said, which was that the 
sovereign had to pay all its creditors on a pro rata basis.25  
Once Elliott won against Peru, others tried to replicate the pari passu 
strategy whenever there was a restructuring (and even if the strategy was not 
used, the sovereign had to take into consideration the risk that the strategy 
would be used). In the immediate four-year period after the Elliott decision, 
holdout investors filed suit against sovereigns (the Congo, Nicaragua, and  
Argentina) in courts located in Belgium, England, and the United States.26 In 
some of the cases, the holdouts won and managed to extract significant 
                                                                                                                      
 20. The facts in this paragraph are taken from Bratton, supra note 19, at 823–25, and Gulati 
& Klee, supra note 15, at 635–36. 
 21. See Barry Eichengreen, Financial Crises and What To Do About Them 75–76 
(2002); Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, Bailouts or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial 
Crises in Emerging Economies (2004); Hal Scott, International Finance (12th ed. 2005); 
Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Redesigning the International Lender of Last Resort, 6 Chi. J. 
Int’l L. 177, 186–87 (2005); Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign 
Debt, 36 Geo. J. Int’l L. 299 (2005).  
 22. Felix Salmon, Pari Passu Clause Is a Threat to Markets, Euromoney, May 2004, at 148. 
 23. Id. 
 24. The various litigations are described in Buchheit & Pam, supra note 15, at 900–16, and 
Phillip R. Wood, Pari Passu Clauses—What Do They Mean?, 2003 Butterworths J. Int’l Bank-
ing & Fin. L. 371. See also Scott, supra note 21, at 307–11 (providing an overview of the pari 
passu controversy). 
 25. The holdout-creditor view is most forcefully articulated in the affidavit of Professor 
Andreas Lowenfeld that is described in Gulati & Klee, supra note 15, at 636–37. See also Salmon, 
supra note 22 (quoting Professor Hal Scott).  
 26. The Peru, Congo, and Nicaragua litigations are described in Buchheit & Pam, supra note 
15, at 877–82, 887–80. For a brief discussion of the Argentine pari passu litigation, see Anna 
Gelpern, What Bond Markets Can Learn from Argentina, Int’l Fin. L. Rev., Apr. 2005, at 19, 22, 
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/gelpern0405.pdf.  
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settlements.27 More important, the sovereign lawyers have not been able to 
get any of the courts in these jurisdictions to adopt their interpretation of the 
pari passu clause.28 
Whatever the merits of the Brussels court’s interpretations, one would 
expect that all contracts after the Elliott case would pay special attention to 
the pari passu clause and clarify its exact meaning. Economic theory tells us 
that absent significant negotiation costs, parties will prefer contracts that are 
clear rather than contracts that present a high likelihood of uncertainty and 
litigation costs. The questions of (a) the degree to which sovereigns and 
their creditors modified their contract language in the wake of the Elliott 
case, and (b) the reasons for why individual sovereigns did or did not alter 
their contractual language, formed the basis for a parallel line of research 
we have pursued examining a dataset of sovereign bond deals from the early 
1990s to the early 2000s.29 Below, we summarize the findings.  
1. Patterns in the Data  
For the thirty-plus countries for which we examined pari passu clauses 
in both the pre- and post-Elliott-periods, we found wide variation in the pre-
cise wording of the clause. Specifically, we found upwards of a dozen 
different versions of the clause.30 In light of the Elliott ruling, and the strict 
textualist approach utilized there, the variations across countries turn out to 
be important. Clauses saying something like “the debt will rank equally with 
all other External Indebtedness” are less vulnerable to an Elliott-type attack 
than language saying “the debt will rank equally with all other External In-
debtedness and will be payable as such.”31  
There was no systematic pattern discernible in the data such as more 
creditworthy countries picking a certain clause and less creditworthy ones 
picking a different clause. The lack of a pattern is consistent with the view 
that the differences are more idiosyncratic than due to any purposeful intent 
to change the pari passu clause to favor (or disfavor) holdouts. A court at-
tempting to read meaning into such differences runs a risk of misinterpreting 
the clause.  
As a follow-up to our quantitative examination of pari passu clauses in 
sovereign bond covenants, we conducted over fifty in-depth interviews with 
                                                                                                                      
 27. See Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructurings, 53 
Emory L.J. 1115, 1133 n.59 (2004) (describing the settlement in the Red Mountain case); see also 
Hagan, supra note 21, at 315 nn.48–50. 
 28. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 15 (discussing the pre-Argentine cases); see also 
Gelpern, supra note 26 (discussing the Argentine litigation over pari passu); Salmon, supra note 22 
(making the point that the interpretive issue remains unresolved even after years of litigation). 
 29. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 12. 
 30. See id. 
 31. The importance, in light of the Elliott case, of these small differences in language is 
discussed at length in the recently released report of elite English lawyers on the matter. See FMLC 
Report, supra note 16, at 19 (describing the differences in pari passu language for Estonia, Croatia, 
and the Philippines). 
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market participants.32 Among our interviewees were prominent attorneys at 
the law firms most involved with sovereign debt deals, either as issuer’s or 
underwriter’s counsel. Market participants uniformly confirmed what the 
quantitative data suggested: the different versions of the clause do not repre-
sent any conscious attempt to vary the pari passu clause. 
2. Responsiveness to Shocks 
For the twenty countries for whom data was available for over at least 
ten issuances during the 1985–2005 period, we found no response to the 
Elliott Associates v. Peru litigation in terms of changes in the language of 
contracts subsequent to the Elliott decision. Nor was there any response to 
any of the later pari passu litigations that followed. While variations existed 
between different countries, no variation existed across bond deals for the 
same sovereign. We attempted to discern why not through our interviews.  
The standard initial response was that it was clear to all that the Elliott 
decision was an aberration. Most lawyers explained that they were confident 
that no New York court would accept the interpretation that Elliott Associates 
was pushing. We pushed these lawyers on their argument by pointing out the 
fact that while the “aberrant” Elliott reading of the clause had found sympa-
thy with multiple courts, including some federal courts in the U.S., the so 
called “sensible” reading had not found favor anywhere as yet.33  
The lawyers who found our first set of quibbles legitimate typically 
came up with a second explanation, telling us that any change in the lan-
guage of the new contracts would run the risk that a court would read the 
modification of the language to mean that while the new contracts meant 
something new, the holdouts were correct in their interpretation of the old 
contracts.34 
But why was it not just as likely, we asked, if not more likely, that a 
court would interpret a change in the contract language in response to the 
interpretive shock as a sign of the market’s disapproval for the interpretive 
shock? At this point, we received the most meaningful responses. The law-
yers explained that it was impossible for standard-form clauses that were 
                                                                                                                      
 32. Thirty-five of these interviews were with lawyers who either are or were active players in 
the sovereign debt market and included not only lawyers at private law firms, but also lawyers in the 
official sector and at investment banks and hedge funds. We may have missed talking to a few of the 
key players in the market, but we conservatively estimate that we spoke to over fifty percent of the 
population of players who understand the pari passu debate. For details, see Choi & Gulati, supra 
note 12. 
 33. Indeed, even when the matter finally came before a New York judge and the “sensible” 
reading was supported by amicus briefs filed by the Federal Reserve, the Clearinghouse, and the 
New York Fed, the judge still chose to duck the issue. See Salmon, supra note 22. The court decision 
and the briefs are available on the Emerging Markets Traders Association website. See EMTA.org, 
New Developments, at http://emta.org/ndevelop/ (last visited October 22, 2005).  
 34. The story resembles the tort tale regarding subsequent repairs, where repairs do not get 
done because of the fear that the very fact of the repairs will be read as a sign that the earlier state of 
matters was faulty. In response to the disincentive to engage in subsequent repairs, evidentiary rules 
typically exclude subsequent repairs from being introduced as evidence of the tortfeasor’s negli-
gence. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 407. 
CHOI & GULATI FTP2.DOC 2/16/2006 8:31 AM 
1138 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:1129 
 
present in every single sovereign debt instrument across the globe to change 
every time there was an aberrant court decision. The issue was coordination. 
As a practical matter, the individual lawyer proposing that his client alter a 
term in response to some interpretive shock faces the possibility that no one 
else will change their terms. And the market is unlikely to accept a non-
standard term. Further, if the court sees that some parties change their terms 
and others do not, parties will find it difficult to argue to the court that the 
market is unambiguous in having an understanding different from that 
which caused the interpretive shock. In sum, it may be in the individual cli-
ent’s interest to stick with the old term. 
3. The Form that the Market’s Response Eventually Took 
The market eventually did provide a coordinated response to the 2000 
Elliott decision as part of an overall litigation strategy but, importantly, not 
in drafting a new set of contract terms clarifying the pari passu clause. In 
the first few pari passu cases filed subsequently to the Elliott decision, there 
was no coordinated response by the sovereign debt community. But by 
2003, when the pari passu matter showed up in a New York court in the case 
involving the Argentine restructuring, the sovereign debt community organ-
ized itself to produce amicus briefs filed by the U.S. Treasury, the New York 
Federal Reserve, and the Clearinghouse, all opposing the holdout position.35 
Note that it is unusual for these institutions to take the step of filing an 
amicus brief in a private contract disputes—the U.S. Treasury, as best we 
know, had filed briefs on only two prior occasions in the sovereign context.36  
As of September 2005, we are aware of no serious attempt to coordinate 
a clarification of the pari passu clause in the contracts themselves. Instead, 
the choice was made to coordinate over litigation strategy. The law firm that 
had been litigating almost all the pari passu cases from the sovereign side, 
Cleary Gottlieb, was also the law firm with the largest volume of business in 
terms of advising new issuances.37 So, if any firm understood the kind of 
problems that pari passu clause was causing and could engineer a coordi-
nated shift in the clause’s language, it was Cleary. Yet, even Cleary’s clients 
were not issuing new bonds with clearer language on the pari passu matter. 
                                                                                                                      
 35. See supra note 33. 
 36. For discussions of the Allied Bank case in 1985 and the Banco Do Brasil case in 1995, 
see Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture Funds: Rehabilitation of a 
Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 Stan. J. Int’l L. 253, 268–73 (2003). Our cynical 
public choice perspective on the matter is that considerable political and financial muscle must have 
been exerted by key private sector interests in pushing these institutions to step in. 
 37. See Thom Weidlich, Cleary Gottlieb’s Iraq Work Secures Place as Top Debt Adviser, 
Bloomberg News (N.Y.), Dec. 7, 2005, available at LEXIS, ALLBBN; see also Stephen J. Choi & 
G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 
53 Emory L.J. 929, 975 (2004) (observing that Cleary has the lion’s share of the sovereign issuer 
market).  
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4. Lessons from the Pari Passu Case 
We take several lessons from the experience with the pari passu clause. 
First, a single court attempting to interpret the meaning of a commercial 
boilerplate term used in a single contract can generate long-lasting and dis-
ruptive consequences for the rest of the market using the same boilerplate 
term. As we discuss, the standard approach to contract interpretation magni-
fies the costs to contracting parties from courts attempting to deal with 
boilerplate.  
Second, even in a market populated with sophisticated players and large 
intermediary organizations, coordination in response to a court ruling may 
take some time, three years in the case of the pari passu clause. Importantly, 
the pari passu market did enjoy large intermediaries that internalized the 
interests of significant subsets of the markets. Both attorney firms and un-
derwriters stand in a position to encourage collective action. Evidence exists 
that Cleary Gottlieb was instrumental in the move toward collective-action 
clauses in the early twenty-first century.38 Yet despite the presence of such 
intermediaries, coordination occurred only after delay. 
Third, the coordinated market response may take many forms. In the 
case of the pari passu clause, when a coordinated response came, it was in 
the form of a litigation response and not in drafting a clearer set of terms. 
The language of the pari passu clause in the new contracts being issued re-
mained the same across a wide number of contracts. As we will argue later, 
the presence of a prior court decision and ongoing litigation surrounding the 
pari passu clause pushed market participants to respond through litigation 
rather than a change in the language of the pari passu boilerplate term di-
rectly. A shift in how courts approach interpreting boilerplate terms may 
reduce the incentive of market groups to respond through litigation and in-
crease the incentive to focus instead on clarifying the meaning of boilerplate 
terms. 
B. International Swap and Derivatives Associations 
The derivatives markets for swaps use boilerplate contracts. With swaps, 
rather than draft a swap contract from scratch, parties turn to both form 
agreements and standardized definitions provided by the International Swap 
and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”).39 Standardized contracts also facili-
tate trades in public markets—otherwise parties would spend large amounts 
of time assessing the various non-standard terms in each traded swap con-
tract. ISDA represents more than 625 member institutions from forty-seven 
countries, including Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, and 
other financial institutions as primary members, and Cravath, Swaine & 
                                                                                                                      
 38. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 37, at 375. 
 39. Kahan and Klausner cite ISDA and the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware state bar 
as instances of standard-setting organizations in the area of bond contracts. See Marcel Kahan & 
Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or “The Economics 
of Boilerplate”), 83 Va. L. Rev. 713, 761–64 (1997). 
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Moore, Dewey Ballantine, and other service providers as associate mem-
bers.40 ISDA membership also includes various end-users of derivative 
instruments, such as Ford Motor Credit Company and General Electric 
Capital Corporation, as subscriber members.41 
Swap contracts can last up to fifteen years. While parties typically nego-
tiate over economic-related terms (such as the interest rate terms, the length 
of the agreement, the fixed versus variable nature of the interest), often non-
economic provisions are not discussed. These include clauses dealing with 
events constituting default, representation and warranties, governing law and 
jurisdiction, and other covenants. Parties leave these non-economic terms to 
the ISDA standardized contract known as the ISDA Master Agreement. The 
Master Agreement contains a series of boilerplate clauses for the non-
economic provisions. ISDA describes its Master Agreement as follows: 
“[M]arket participants developed the ISDA Master Agreement . . . which 
would contain the ‘non-economic’ terms . . . leaving counterparties free to 
negotiate only the ‘economic’ terms—that is, rate or price, notional amount, 
maturity, collateral, and so on.”42 ISDA also publishes a “User’s Guide” to 
the Master Agreement detailing the purpose and use of the ISDA Master 
Agreement provisions as well as how the provisions differ from prior itera-
tions of the Master Agreement. 
Parties supplement the Master Agreement with the negotiated economic 
provisions. Typically, parties document the economic terms in a “Confirma-
tion” statement. Parties may include all the definitions for relevant terms 
within the Confirmation itself (a “Long-Form Confirmation”). Alternatively, 
parties may incorporate a separate set of standard definitions by reference in 
the Confirmation (a “Short-Form Confirmation”). 
ISDA promulgates various sets of “Definitions” containing a glossary of 
standardized terms to which contracting parties may refer in the Confirma-
tion of economic terms. For example, in the 1999 ISDA Definitions, ISDA 
specifies a set of floating rate indices and currency definitions. Parties nego-
tiating an interest rate swap may simply refer to one of the ISDA indices 
rather than define the indices from scratch in setting up a swap involving a 
variable interest rate. ISDA frequently supplements the 1999 Definitions, 
providing, among other things, definitions for new floating rate indices. 
Several lessons emerge from the market for swap and derivative con-
tracts. First, boilerplate terms provide benefits to market participants, 
reducing the number of “deal” points on which negotiating parties must con-
tract, thereby reducing contracting costs and speeding up transactions. In the 
                                                                                                                      
 40. See International Swaps and Derivatives Association Primary Membership List, 
http://www.isda.org/membership/list_of_primary.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2005) (providing a list of 
Primary-level members). 
 41. See International Swaps and Derivatives Association Subscriber Members, http:// 
www.isda.org/membership/list_of_subscribers.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2005) (providing a list of 
Subscriber-level members). 
 42. Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions: 
No. 28 Why Is Derivatives Documentation (Such as the ISDA Master Agreement) Important?, 
http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html#28 (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). 
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case of swaps and other derivatives, standardization makes possible after-
market trading in these financial instruments.  
Second, industry associations that represent the interests of all the major 
participants in a sophisticated, commercial market, such as ISDA, can form. 
Where contracting parties are sophisticated, an industry association must 
include a variety of market participants to have effectiveness. If ISDA repre-
sented only the interests of financial institutions in the United States when 
providing standard-form contracts, few institutions outside the United States 
would accept such contracts when dealing with the U.S. institutions.  
Third, certain markets are capable of generating boilerplate contract 
terms and providing detailed documentation of these terms. ISDA serves 
this function for the swap and derivatives contracts market. ISDA provides 
User’s Guides and updates its contracts and definitional provisions to meet 
the needs of the marketplace. In the case of the ISDA Master Agreement, 
ISDA dictates the standardized form of how swap and derivative contracts 
will take place. Individual parties may choose to modify this standard, but 
the incentives are against modification. Doing so is costly, generates legal 
uncertainty, and results in instruments that are less tradable on the secondary 
market (where traders expect the ISDA Master Agreement to govern). 
Fourth, the lack of any mandate that parties use the ISDA Master 
Agreement and definitions has not hindered the use of such terms in the 
marketplace. Parties use the terms and accompanying ISDA User’s Guides 
because of the value they derive from standardization. Moreover, parties are 
clear when they use the IDSA Master Agreement or definitions. Parties will 
explicitly incorporate the ISDA 2000 Definitions in Short-Form Confirma-
tions containing the economic provisions of their agreement, for example. 
Courts attempting to interpret the meaning of a swap agreement, as a result, 
have clear guidance when they are dealing with an ISDA Master Agreement 
or definitions. 
Lastly, why don’t we see more entities like ISDA in other markets?43 
There are a number of possible reasons: 
Not all markets consist solely of sophisticated participants. Even where 
sophisticated participants predominate, commonalities may not exist across 
the range of participants in what parties desire to see in a contract. The buy-
ers and suppliers of a particular raw input in an industry may have varying 
preferences on the types of terms they wish to see in their contract. Where 
variations exist, little gain may exist from drafting standardized terms. 
Status quo is important. Where an industry already has standard-setting 
entities, such as law firms with their own in-house boilerplate provisions, 
the gain to establishing a centralized standard-setting entity such as ISDA is 
reduced. In the sovereign bond market, for example, where there are but a 
handful of lawyers with expertise about the meanings of boilerplate terms 
and, as a result, have a lion’s share of the business, these lawyers may have 
                                                                                                                      
 43. This is not to say that entities like ISDA do not exist in other markets. Nonprofits, for 
example, play a role in developing boilerplate terms. See Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in 
the Production of Boilerplate, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1075 (2006). 
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an incentive to resist moves toward a central standard setter.44 The emer-
gence of bodies like ISDA, with their standard forms and their User’s 
Guides and Definitions of Terms eliminates much of the advantage that 
these elite law firms might have otherwise had as a result of their in-house 
knowledge. Conversely, resistance to centralized standard-setting organiza-
tions may come from the smaller players in the market who fear that the 
standard setter will get captured by the elites and the result will be private 
lawmaking that systematically favors the elites. 
The deference courts give to the intent and guidance of a standard setter 
is important. Where courts ignore the standard setter, instead focusing on the 
specific intent of the contracting parties themselves, the standard setter pro-
vides little benefit beyond simply drafting the language of the boilerplate 
term. On the other hand, where courts give more deference to guidance pro-
vided by a standard setter on the meaning of boilerplate, as we propose later 
in the Article, a greater benefit exists to the industry from establishing a cen-
tralized standard-setting organization such as ISDA.  
In concluding, it helps to look at what happened recently when an ambi-
guity did arise in the ISDA documentation. The cases we discuss involve 
swap contracts written on sovereign debt (in other words, involving many of 
the same lawyers from the pari passu debate).  
C. The Eternity Cases and the Meaning of “Restructuring” 
For institutions that invest in sovereign debt, but are concerned about the 
risk of default, the market provides swaps that hedge against default risk. 
The relevant market here is a large one that has been growing quickly—it 
grew from between $100 and $200 billion in 1996 to $4.8 trillion in 2004 
and $6.5 trillion in 2005.45 The Eternity cases arose out of a series of swaps 
that were written on Argentine debt.46 The events that would trigger the swap 
contracts were defined under the title “Restructuring.” Included in the defi-
nition of “Restructuring,” in addition to the traditional types of defaults, was 
something called an “Obligation Exchange.”47 Argentina formally defaulted 
on its debt in December 2001. But prior to that, Argentina had attempted a 
series of exchanges that it referred to as “voluntary exchanges” where it 
swapped around $50 billion of its shorter term obligations for longer term 
                                                                                                                      
 44. This is not to say that there won’t be rent-acquisition opportunities for these same elite 
lawyers to take control of the standard-setting process. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 598 
(concluding that rent-seeking by interest groups can occur in expert advisory processes such as 
those set up by the ALI). 
 45. See James Warnot & Justin Williamson, ISDA Definitions Unclear, Says U.S. Court, 
Int’l Fin. L. Rev. Sept. 2004, at 27, 27. For full citations to the Eternity cases, see infra note 54. 
 46. The material in this subsection that tackles the Eternity cases is solely the responsibility 
of coauthor Choi and does not represent the views of coauthor Gulati (who, although he did not take 
on the project, was contacted by J.P. Morgan about being an expert on the matter).  
 47. See Salmon, supra note 48, at 33. 
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lower rates and better secured debt.48 At issue in the Eternity cases was 
whether a “voluntary exchange” qualified as an “Obligation Exchange” and 
thus triggered the default provision in the swap contracts. 
The Argentine swap contracts explicitly adopt the ISDA definitions. Un-
der the ISDA Master Agreement, Obligation Exchanges are defined as 
“mandatory” exchanges imposed on the Argentine bondholders where any 
one of a set of things occurred (including reductions in the principal amount 
of the debt or the interest rate).49 This definition makes some sense in the 
corporate context where the debtor and its creditors who are seeking to 
avoid the costs of entering a formal Chapter 11 proceeding often use pre-
packaged bankruptcies (“prepacks”).50 Once court approval for a prepack is 
obtained, the terms of the prepack become mandatory on all the creditors, 
including minority creditors who did not voluntarily accept the terms. But 
there is no Chapter 11 bankruptcy equivalent for sovereigns and, therefore, 
no prepacks either. The same kind of “mandatory” exchange cannot take 
place—at least for sovereign bonds governed under New York law—where 
unanimous consent of the bondholders is typically required for any reduc-
tions in principal or interest amounts.51  
The ISDA definitions were designed with corporate debtors in mind.52 
Importing the ISDA definition relating to an “Obligation Exchange” into the 
sovereign context resulted in ambiguity.53 Contractual terms that lack a clear 
meaning are an invitation for some clever lawyer to say “I know what that 
clause means. It means that you owe me $X million dollars.” That is pre-
cisely what happened in the case of the pari passu clause. In the Eternity 
cases, some of those who had purchased swaps on Argentine debt that ex-
pired prior to Argentina’s formal default in December 2001, but after the 
“voluntary” exchanges that took place in November, asserted that “manda-
tory” included those exchanges achieved through economic coercion and 
that Argentina’s so-called “voluntary” exchanges were actually coercive and 
therefore mandatory.54 
                                                                                                                      
 48. See id.; see also Felix Salmon, Sovereign Market Awaits Court Verdicts, Euromoney, 
May 2002, at 32, 32.  
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. The requirement of unanimous consent was the norm for sovereign bonds governed by 
N.Y. law at the time the swaps at issue in the Eternity cases were entered into. That norm has since 
changed, with typical N.Y. law sovereign bonds now requiring supermajority consent. See Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Statement of Under Secretary John B. Taylor Regarding the Deci-
sions by Countries to Issue Bonds with Collective Action Clauses (Feb. 3, 2004), available at 
www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1144.htm. 
 52. See Salmon, supra note 48, at 32–33; see also B. Gerard Dages et al., Fed. Reserve 
Bank of N.Y., An Overview of the Emerging Market Credit Derivatives Market (2005), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs22fedny4.pdf. 
 53. See Salmon, supra note 48. 
 54. See Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 
182 (2d Cir. 2004); Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., No. 02 
Civ.1312(LMM)(GWG), 2003 WL 21305355 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2003); Eternity Global Master Fund 
Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., No. 02 Civ.1312(LMM), 2002 WL 31426310 (S.D.N.Y. 
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Our interest is not in the outcomes of these cases or in the validity of the 
arguments. It is in how ISDA reacted to the ambiguity and how the courts 
used the ISDA materials as sources of authority. On the matter of the ISDA 
reaction, even before the Second Circuit tackled the case in 2004 (the first 
district court opinion came down in late 2002 and the second one in mid-
2003), ISDA moved to delete “Obligation Exchanges” from the definition of 
a “Restructuring” in its revised 2003 Definitions.55 In addition a committee 
was formed to tackle the question of what should be done to deal with the 
special problems of derivatives drawn on sovereign debt contracts.56 An ex-
pert group of elite sovereign debt lawyers was formed soon after the 
Eternity litigation came about and that committee produced a report with 
recommendations to ISDA. ISDA then acted within a matter of months.  
The contrast with the pari passu case is striking, since at least some of 
the same expert sovereign debt lawyers involved in that pari passu litigation 
participated in the ISDA revision process. The same lawyers who took years 
to respond to litigation or other interpretive shocks in the absence of a cen-
tralized standard setter, responded extremely quickly when there existed an 
effective standard-setting body such as ISDA to work through. With ISDA, 
the response was immediate. The presence of ISDA ensured a mechanism 
for coordination and prompt response—a point that finds support in other 
examples of prompt ISDA responses to documentation problems.57 In the 
pari passu case, although there was discussion about the need to form an 
expert committee and produce a report, there was no committee formed and 
the uncertainty remains unresolved five years later;58 moreover, sovereign 
debt contracts as of this writing still all contain the same unclear pari passu 
language. Significantly, the pari passu and Eternity contract ambiguities 
were not isolated cases. They were arguably the two biggest contractual am-
biguities that the sovereign debt market has had to deal with in fifty years.  
                                                                                                                      
Oct. 29, 2002). In addition to the Eternity litigations, there were three other cases involving the same 
set of circumstances. See Warnot & Williamson, supra note 45, at 28–29 (reporting on these cases); 
Salmon, supra note 48. 
 55. See Salmon, supra note 48; see also Dages et al., supra note 52 (discussing revisions in 
the 2003 Definitions that were made to counter the problems that the Argentine default and the 
resulting swap disputes revealed). 
 56. See Salmon, supra note 48.  
 57. The ISDA 1999 Definition of a Restructuring itself was a response to the ambiguities that 
the 1998 Russian default revealed—such as whether the Russian domestic debt “reinvestment” 
program constituted a restructuring, whether it was material, how deliverable obligations should be 
valued, and which obligations were covered. See Dages et al., supra note 52.  
 58. See Letter from Charles H. Dallara, Managing Dir., Inst. of Int’l Fin., to Gordon Brown, 
Chairman, Int’l Monetary & Fin. Comm., (Apr. 9, 2002), available at http://www.iif.com/data/ 
public/icdc0402.pdf (discussing the need to set up an expert committee to tackle the ambiguity and 
uncertainty caused by the Elliott Associates v. Peru litigation). In England, thanks to the coordinat-
ing efforts of the Bank of England, an expert committee finally came out with a report earlier this 
year (2005). See FMLC Report, supra note 16. In the United States, however, the coordination of 
such an effort has proved difficult. On the unresolved state of the pari passu debate, see Salmon, 
supra note 22.  
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II. The Problem with Boilerplate 
In sophisticated markets, conventional wisdom holds that the standard-
ized nature of these contracts means that everyone (that is, “the market”) 
understands them. The terms in these contracts are the ones that the market 
has determined as optimal, hence their widespread adoption. Interpretation 
(and pricing) is easy because there is only one set of terms, and everyone 
understands what these terms mean. Even if courts make mistakes in inter-
pretation, the story goes, the market will contract around those mistakes.59 
We contend that the interpretation of boilerplate terms in these contracts is 
nowhere near as easy as one might think.  
A. Traditional Contract Interpretation 
Courts follow certain precisely defined “canons” of contract interpreta-
tion. In assessing these canons as applied to boilerplate terms, we assume 
that the goal of contract interpretation is to minimize the transaction costs 
facing contracting parties.60 Judge Posner sets forth two types of costs that 
make up the overall transaction cost: “drafting-stage costs” and “litigation-
stage costs.”61 While drafting-stage costs are always incurred, the litigation-
stage costs “must be discounted, that is multiplied, by the probability of a 
legal dispute.”62  
Under standard canons of contract interpretation, courts first attempt to 
discern the intent of the parties (the meeting of the minds) from the lan-
guage of the contract. Second, if actual intent is obscure, courts will turn to 
the course of dealings and course of performance between the contracting 
parties in an attempt to indirectly determine intent. Courts will sometimes 
use course of dealings or course of performance between a set of parties to 
trump even explicit terms in the contract.63 Third, courts will look to indus-
try custom and practice. Lastly, courts will examine the Uniform 
                                                                                                                      
 59. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 3, at 1588 (“[S]ince the judicial gap-filling contract rules are 
only gap fillers, the parties can negate such a rule by expressly rejecting it in their contract. In other 
words, unlike many other legal rules, gap-filling rules for contract cases are subject to the discipline 
of the market.”). 
 60. Posner states that the goal of contract interpretation should be to minimize overall con-
tracting transaction costs. See id. at 1583. Minimizing transaction costs will, in turn, allow more 
transactions that increase the joint welfare of the contracting parties to go forward. Positive accounts 
exist on the efficiency of contract law. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incom-
plete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 91–94 (1989). We note, 
without jumping into the debate, that no one theory, whether based on autonomy or economic effi-
ciency, has succeeded either in positively describing contract law or setting forth a consistent norm 
for contract law to follow. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three 
Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 Yale L.J. 829, 830 (2003). 
 61. Posner, supra note 3, at 1584.  
 62. Id. 
 63. See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 781, 787 (1999) (“[P]erhaps surprisingly, if a past practice is in conflict with an ex-
plicit contractual provision, the past practice will often be allowed to vary and trump the express 
terms.” (citing U.C.C. § 2-208(3))). 
CHOI & GULATI FTP2.DOC 2/16/2006 8:31 AM 
1146 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:1129 
 
Commercial Code for a specifically applicable term, if any. For example, 
UCC § 2-304 provides that the price in contract may be payable by money, 
goods, realty, or otherwise. Importantly, the process of contract interpreta-
tion flows from evidence specific to the parties outward to more general and 
contextual sources of contract meaning.64 
Several costs exist in applying standard contract interpretation tech-
niques to boilerplate that exceed the typical transaction costs for a non-
boilerplate contract, as we discuss below. 
1. Textual Analysis 
The first interpretive method that a court is likely to apply is textual 
analysis, looking at the language of the contract. Formalists would have 
courts stop at the text itself as the sole source of interpretive authority, ap-
plying tie-breaking rules where the text is ambiguous. Further, formalists 
view all clauses in the contract as dated as of the time that the contract was 
signed. Such a hard ex post approach will lead contracting parties (and trade 
associations and other aggregating institutions) to provide standardized 
terms and standardized understandings to the market, increasing the cer-
tainty of contracts and ultimately decreasing dispute and litigation-related 
costs. The approach also results in greater upfront drafting costs. High up-
front costs are justified where the alternative, greater expected litigation 
costs, would be even higher. For example, where judges are life-time bu-
reaucrats, lack practical business experience, and are likely to generate 
error-prone interpretations of contract terms, the argument for a formalistic 
approach to minimize inexpert judge error costs takes on significance.65  
The nature of boilerplate terms suggests that looking to the text of the 
contract alone is problematic. The point of using a boilerplate clause is to 
invoke, along with the language of the clause, all of the historical context 
and learning that comes with it. Otherwise, the parties could simply custom-
ize a clause that captures their particular understandings. Focusing on solely 
the text may miss particular nuances of language deriving out of this histori-
cal context leading to court errors of interpretation and greater uncertainty 
for contracting parties. Consider the following two examples of potential 
court error that may arise from applying solely textual analysis in analyzing 
the meaning of boilerplate clauses. 
                                                                                                                      
 64. We are oversimplifying somewhat in the text. As noted earlier, the U.C.C. itself complicated 
the hierarchy we describe in the text in that it seems to accord importance to evidence from trade usage, 
course of dealing, and performance even where the terms of the contract itself are perfectly clear and 
are “integrated.” See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice, 73 Cal. 
L. Rev. 261, 274–76 (1985). 
 65. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1583.  
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a. Conflicting Boilerplate Clauses 
The following two clauses appeared in at least a half dozen issuances of 
sovereign debt by Mexico during the 2003–2005 period.66 The first clause is 
the Mexican collective-action clause (“CAC”) governing changes in pay-
ment related terms. In March of 2003, Mexico was the first of the big 
sovereign borrowers to move from unanimity action clauses (“UACs”) to 
CACs.67 Mexico’s CAC clause became the model for practically every other 
sovereign borrower seeking to issue bonds in the New York market.68 This 
clause became one of the most discussed and carefully scrutinized contract 
clauses in the history of the world financial markets.69 The clause70 states 
that 75% or more of the creditors (in aggregate principal amount) on a par-
ticular bond instrument can agree to modify the payment terms of the 
instrument.71 
When Mexico made its shift to CACs, it had to make all sorts of public 
disclosures to its investors in its road shows and press conferences to pro-
mote the offering and in the text of its prospectus supplements.72 In the 
contract itself though, on the page following the page where the new 75%-
CAC-modification clause appeared was an “Obligation Absolute” clause.73 
The Obligation Absolute clause provided that “no provision of this Note or 
of the Fiscal Agency Agreement shall alter or impair the obligation, which is 
absolute and unconditional, to pay principal of and any premium, if any, and 
interest on this Note.”74 
These two clauses seem both clear and in contradiction with one an-
other. Traditional contract analysis would take the view that it makes little 
sense that the parties would include these two contradictory provisions. So, 
                                                                                                                      
 66. See the “Terms and Conditions” section in the Sub-Authorization Certificates for issuances 
dated Mar. 3, 2003, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/101368/000090342303000227/ums18ka_ 
02-28.txt; June 10, 2003, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/101368/000090342303000515/ums18 
kaex1_06-10.txt; Nov. 19, 2003 (AuthorizationCertificate), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ data/ 
101368/000112528203006283/b328193_ex9-e.htm; Jan. 13, 2004, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ edgar/ 
data/101368/000095012304000308/y93195exv99w1.txt; Apr. 27, 2004, http://www.sec.gov/ Archives/ 
edgar/data/101368/000095012304006039/y97209exv99w1.htm; Aug. 9, 2004, http://www. sec.gov/ Ar-
chives/edgar/data/101368/000095012304009881/y00759exv99w1.htm; Nov. 22, 2004, http:// www.sec 
gov/Archives/edgar/data/101368/000095012304014077/y69121exv99w1.htm; Jan. 7, 2005, http:// 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/101368/000095012305000163/ y04635a2ex v99w1.htm.  
 67. See Int’l Monetary Fund, Collective Action Clauses: Recent Developments 
and Issues 20 (2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/psi/2003/032503.pdf. 
 68. See id.  
 69. See Anna Gelpern, How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign Debt, Int’l Fin. L. 
Rev., May 2003, at 19, 19; see also Roubini & Setser, supra note 21, ch. 8. 
 70. United Mexican States, Form 18-K/A, at Ex. 2, cl. 11 (Mar. 3, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/101368/000090342303000227/ums18ka_02-28.txt. 
 71. See United Mexican States, Prospectus [Rule 424(b)(3)], at 1 (Dec. 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/101368/000090342303000995/ums-424b_1202.txt. 
 72. The prospectus for Mexico, for example, states on the cover page that these particular 
issuances are governed by CACs and not the traditional UACs. Id. 
 73. United Mexican States, Form 18-K/A, supra note 70, at Ex. 2, cl. 14. 
 74. Id. 
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proceeding on the assumption that rational parties would not include contra-
dictory provisions, the court would try to reconcile the two provisions.75 And 
if that were not possible, the provisions would knock each other out. The 
end result: confusion and a greater likelihood of court error.  
To the extent that contracts with boilerplate pull from different clauses 
from varying historical sources, a “Frankenstein” contract may result. Taking 
a boilerplate analysis that looks to the histories of the clauses can help inter-
pret these Frankenstein contracts. In the case of Mexico’s bond covenants, a 
historical analysis would reveal that one of the clauses (Obligation Abso-
lute) was older and a relic of when sovereign bond contracts used unanimity 
language similar to that used in domestic corporate bonds. The same analy-
sis would reveal that the other clause (CAC) is of recent vintage and 
intended to trump the unanimity language. While attorneys succeeded in 
removing the most explicit language about unanimity, they neglected to re-
move additional clauses that also reflected the unanimity sentiment. Once 
this inadvertence is recognized, the need to place greater weight on the more 
recent vintage collective-action clause becomes clear. 
b. Treating Small Differences in Language as Deeply Meaningful 
In our pari passu case study, we reported that the pari passu language 
for every sovereign was not the same.76 Instead, there are small differences 
in the language; our data revealed at least twelve different versions of this 
so-called standard clause.77 We saw, for example, that while the most stan-
                                                                                                                      
 75. Even a brief examination of the case law will reveal that courts are skilled at reconciling 
seemingly inconsistent provisions, whether they be in statutes or contracts, explicit or implicit. See 
Goetz & Scott, supra note 64, at 285 (“[T]here is almost always some contextual argument upon 
which seemingly inconsistent terms can be rationalized.”).  
 76. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 12. 
 77. Among the versions of the pari passu clause in our database were the following dozen 
(references are to the issuer, quantity, type of offering, and date of the offering):  
• “The debt securities . . . will rank at least pari passu without any preference among them-
selves. The payment obligations . . . will at all times rank at least equally with all other 
payment obligations of Jamaica.” Jamaica, $300 million, Registered Offering, dated 
5/25/05. 
• “[The debt securities] . . . will rank equal in right of payment among themselves and with 
all of Mexico’s existing and future unsecured and unsubordinated public external indebt-
edness.” Mexico, $1 billion, Registered Offering, $1 billion, 1/4/05.  
• “The notes will rank pari passu with all other unsecured Indebtedness of the Issuer.” Por-
tugal (U.S. law), $ 2billion, Registered Offering, 7/26/05. 
• “The obligations under the Bonds . . . will rank at all times at least pari passu in all re-
spects with all other present and future outstanding unsecured indebtedness issued, 
created, or assumed by Portugal.” Portugal (German Law), DM 1.5 billion, Bearer 
Bonds, 7/2/93. 
• “The bonds shall at all times rank pari passu without any preference among themselves.” 
Russia, $2 billion, Private Offering, 6/24/97. 
• “[The bonds] will rank equal in right of payment among themselves and with all of Uru-
guay’s existing and future unsecured and unsubordinated foreign debt as defined (under 
the Negative Pledge) below.” Uruguay, $250 million, Registered Offering, 3/20/02. 
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dard articulation of the clause was that the sovereign’s debt would “rank 
pari passu in priority” with all other unsubordinated debt of the sovereign, 
there are clauses, such as that of Italy, that are more specific and say that the 
sovereign’s debt will “rank pari passu in priority and will be payable as 
such.”78 Applying traditional contract analysis where we assume that the 
parties intend these small differentials in wording to have significance, we 
would treat the Italian clause as different from the more standard one. And 
the commentators who have compared the Italian pari passu clause to the 
others precisely predict this result: that the Italian clause is going to be 
treated differently.79 
But take a boilerplate analysis. Let us say that the Italian version of the 
clause is some historical relic from well before the Elliott Associates v. Peru 
case. Lawyers around the world have slightly different phraseology in their 
contracts, but they are all trying to do the same thing. And that is to invoke 
the historical understandings of the clause. They are not trying to set forth a 
customized version of their own clause that is independent of the historical 
understandings. Changes may occur to clauses deriving from the same 
original boilerplate, not out of a deliberate attempt to change the meaning of 
the term but rather due to stylistic preferences of a particular attorney or 
                                                                                                                      
• “The Debt Securities . . . will rank equally . . . Amounts payable in respect of principal 
and interest . . . will be charged upon and be payable out of the State Revenue Account 
of the South African Government . . . equally and ratably with all other amounts so 
charged and amounts.” South Africa, $1 billion, Registered Offering, 5/24/04. 
• “[The bonds r]ank at least equally in right of payment with all of the Philippines’ other 
unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness.” Philippines, $1.5 billion, Regis-
tered Offering, 1/26/05. 
• “The bonds . . . shall at all times rank pari passu and without any preference among 
themselves. The payment obligations of the Republic shall . . . at all times rank at least 
equally with all its other payment obligations relating to External Public Debt.” Vene-
zuela, $1.5 billion, Registered Offering, 4/21/05. 
• “The Notes . . . rank and . . . will rank at least pari passu with all other, subject to Condi-
tion 3 (Negative Pledge), unsecured Indebtedness of the Republic other than any 
Indebtedness preferred by Lebanese Law.” Lebanon, $400 million, Private Offering, 
5/6/01. 
• “The payment obligations of Israel under the bonds will at all times rank at least equally 
with all other payment obligations of Israel relating to unsecured, unsubordinated exter-
nal indebtedness.” Israel, $500 million, Registered Offering, 5/7/05. 
• “They will rank equally with all of our present and future unsecured and unsubordinated 
general borrowing . . . . We will pay amounts due on the debt securities equally and rata-
bly with all general loan obligations of Italy.” Italy, $4 billion, Registered Offering, 
1/13/05. 
Choi & Gulati, supra note 12. 
 78. Based on our interviews, we are fairly certain that the Italian clauses were not drafted 
with the goal of favoring the holdout creditors. Rather, Italy’s advisers assumed that they had much 
the same clauses as did every other sovereign borrower. In the wake of the Elliott case, however, the 
Emerging Markets Creditors Association did consciously draft a pari passu clause that favored the 
holdouts’ interpretation. See Michael M. Chamberlin, A Casual Observer’s Commentary on the 
Taylor Proposal and EMCA’s Model Covenants for New Sovereign Debt Issues (5/3/02 draft), (Aug. 
9, 2002) (draft manuscript), available at http://www.emcreditors.com/pdf/n_Chamberlin_on 
_covs.pdf. As best we know, the EMCA clauses were not adopted by any sovereign.  
 79. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 15. 
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even transcription errors. If the reason for a particular piece of language is to 
invoke historical understandings, as opposed to setting out a customized 
statement of intent, then it is not at all clear that the small differences in lan-
guage, such as that between Italy and the other sovereigns, should be given 
much weight at all. Italy’s lawyers likely were trying to invoke the same 
history that the lawyers for Belize and Argentina and Peru were invoking, 
each with their slightly different clauses. 
One might ask how a court is to distinguish between a historical invoca-
tion and a special customized clause. The answer has to do with the nature 
of boilerplate. If Italy was trying to adopt a customized understanding for 
these parties, then we would see that specified in the prospectus and flagged 
prominently. But, instead, if we see that this same clause has been there ever 
since the first Italian contract was negotiated and is phrased in a particular 
way largely because Italy’s lawyers did not foresee the Elliott Associates v. 
Peru case, then we should treat it similarly with other boilerplate clauses 
deriving out of the same historical tradition. With boilerplate, small differ-
ences in language should not be treated as having great meaning. The 
market does not price these differences as meaningful, the lawyers do not 
understand them as such (mostly, they do not even notice them), and the 
only people with an incentive to push these differences are the litigators rep-
resenting typical holdout investors seeking to maximize their short-term, ex 
post position.  
c. What About the Penalty Default Approach 
in the Foregoing Two Cases?  
Court mistakes due to a formalist approach may act like a penalty de-
fault, forcing contracting parties to write better-specified contracts with 
fewer ambiguous terms.80 Penalty defaults in the context of boilerplate 
terms, however, are unlikely to reduce overall transaction costs. First, be-
cause the actual contracting parties did not draft the boilerplate provision 
(and likely do not even understand the meaning of the boilerplate terms), 
imposing a penalty interpretation approach may not result in many of the 
parties changing their contracting behavior. To go back to the pari passu 
case study, what the court did in Elliott Associates v. Peru, in taking a strict 
textualist view, was to impose a penalty on the market for its failure to pro-
vide clarity. We have seen from not only the cost to Peru, but the cost in 
subsequent litigations (not to say anything of the uncertainties created), that 
the penalty was substantial. Yet, the market was unable to respond by pro-
viding greater clarity in its contracts. Instead, the pari passu study suggests 
that parties will sometimes endure the cost of greater court errors, reducing 
the overall surplus from contracting behavior.  
Second, a penalty default approach may lead some parties to pay closer 
attention to which boilerplate terms they select. Parties will be uncertain 
                                                                                                                      
 80. On penalty defaults in contract law, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contrac-
tual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729, 757 (1992). 
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whether relying on a particular boilerplate will in fact avoid the penalty. The 
specter of the penalty, in the form of court errors, will lead parties to expend 
costly resources in assessing the boilerplate term, eliminating most of the 
cost savings from using boilerplate in the first place. For those parties that 
choose to eschew a boilerplate term and draft their own term, higher costs 
are incurred. Parties desire boilerplate terms as private-market contractual 
gap-fillers for terms over which the parties do not wish to negotiate. It is 
therefore dubious whether it is socially desirable to get the actual contract-
ing parties to focus more on the boilerplate terms at the time of contracting. 
For boilerplate terms, even courts that fear they lack expertise to handle 
ambiguous boilerplate terms may turn, under our approach, to the intent of 
the original drafters, a source of expertise that will minimize the court error 
in dealing with boilerplate terms. Once parties start introducing  
non-boilerplate provisions, courts will lack a centralized authority to which 
to turn, leading to more frequent court errors.81 
2. Contextual Analysis 
The usual alternative to textual formalist analysis is contextual analy-
sis.82 The context that one looks to in contract interpretation is that 
surrounding the parties in dispute (course of dealing) and, beyond that, in-
dustry custom and trade usage. Here, neither is likely to give one much help 
due to (a) idiosyncratic contracting parties who do not represent the interests 
                                                                                                                      
 81. Why should sophisticated, commercial parties care about court errors? Alan Schwartz 
and Robert Scott argue that business parties will not care about variance in court interpretation. See 
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 576–77. Higher variance in interpretation leads to more errors. 
Such errors, assuming courts get the interpretations correct on average, means that a party will 
sometimes benefit and sometimes lose based on any one error. But on average, according to 
Schwartz and Scott, these errors will even out. Business parties that are risk-neutral will, thus, not 
care about the errors. In the case of boilerplate terms, we disagree with the Schwartz and Scott view 
on court errors. Litigation over forgotten meanings is likely to be one-sided because it is only parties 
with short-term interests who will push aggressively for meanings that are inconsistent with the 
long-term interests of the majority of players. Often there is some initial starting point of under-
standing for what the boilerplate terms mean (or at least what the terms do not mean). Consider 
again the pari passu clause. Many believed that the pari passu clause did not prevent a sovereign 
from giving preferential payments to a particular creditor, or perhaps more accurately, never gave 
any thought to the pari passu clause at all prior to the Elliot litigation. Preferential payments to the 
IMF and other international organizations were common when a sovereign was in distress and bond 
prices reflected this practice ex ante. One can therefore see the large cost to sovereigns if the clause 
is interpreted instead to forbid preferential payouts (to the IMF for example). The sovereigns will 
not be able to obtain new financing and the country’s welfare will fall as a result (or, in the alterna-
tive, the sovereign will have to pay off the holdout creditors with a hefty premium). On the other 
hand, it is unclear what the cost to the holdout creditors is if the clause is interpreted not to forbid 
preferential payouts since the price they paid already took this into account. Court errors that deviate 
from the understandings of the majority of participants in the market, therefore, may create dramatic 
and asymmetric shifts in wealth among contracting parties. The magnitude of court errors may also 
be quite large. Consider the interpretive battles over the meaning of the pari passu clause in the 
sovereign bond context. As the Argentine litigation illustrated vividly, literally billions of dollars 
turned on how the clause was interpreted. Collective-action problems among participants exacerbate 
these error costs. Where errors of interpretation take place infrequently but with large magnitude, 
even sophisticated commercial parties may not take a risk-neutral attitude to such errors. 
 82. See id. at 572 (describing the contextual approach to contract interpretation). 
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of the group of contracting parties in the industry that may rely on a particu-
lar boilerplate term, and (b) the paradox of efficiency for boilerplate terms 
that may undermine the ability of courts to rely on industry custom. 
a. Idiosyncratic Contracting Parties 
In the boilerplate context, a focus on the needs of the specific parties be-
fore the court may adversely impact the welfare of other contracting parties. 
An interpretation that increases value for the specific parties may reduce 
overall value for the majority of other parties using the same term.83 
Even where the specific parties before the court are not systematically 
different from others, the resources of the specific parties are unlikely to 
match the resources of the group of all contracting parties. Once a dispute 
arrives at court, there will exist at least two opposing opinions on how the 
court should interpret a particular boilerplate term. How well a particular 
position is viewed by the court will depend in part on resources and abilities 
of the particular party pushing the position before the court. Other interested 
parties can submit amicus briefs to the court, but their influence will likely 
be less than that of a litigant before the court.  
Providing clarity to boilerplate terms, made incomplete with the vaga-
ries of time, through litigation as opposed to a more collaborative process 
incorporating interests across all contracting parties can lead to skewed in-
terpretations. Litigation is inherently adversarial. Only two out of many 
possible positions get full vetting before the court. Parties in litigation have 
few dimensions along which they may trade to broker compromises. 
Parties in litigation may also place too much weight on their particular 
ex post situation compared with the overall future benefit of the pool of all 
contracting parties. For example, an employee, once in litigation, may argue 
against broadly interpreting a boilerplate term prohibiting the employee 
from engaging in related work activities after leaving the employer. Em-
ployees generally, however, may favor such a term at the time they enter into 
such contracts to the extent they result in higher wages. One saw something to 
this effect happen in the Elliott Associates v. Peru case, where Peru settled 
with Elliott based on an ex parte decision interpreting the pari passu clause. It 
was in the political interests of Peru’s government to not be seen as defaulting 
                                                                                                                      
 83. Stewart Macaulay kindly pointed out to us that our cost calculus might have to change in 
circumstances where the deal in question was one that evolved as a function of the relationship. For 
example, take a construction project where evolving circumstances idiosyncratic to the particular 
project—such as unduly soft soil calling for stronger foundations—might alter the relationship. 
There, looking to the “real deal”, as captured by the pattern of conduct of the parties and industry 
custom, might be important even where parties were using standard boilerplate contracts. In the 
examples from the sovereign bond and derivatives industries that we use though, there is very little 
room for interaction among the contracting parties after the original deal. The “real deal” is the 
original “paper deal”. The only problem is that sometimes parties do not know what the “paper 
deal” is. What we do know though is that parties intend to enter into the standard deal, under the 
standard contract, that everyone else is entering into. On the distinction between “real” and “paper” 
deals, see Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, 
Complexity, and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, in Implicit Dimensions of Contract 3, 
51–102 (David Campbell et al. eds., 2003). 
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on its Brady bonds (the Fujimori government was on its last legs). But the 
cost of leaving the Brussels interpretation unchallenged produced a signifi-
cant amount of uncertainty for the rest of the market. 
Focusing on the intent of the specific contracting parties also invites 
strategic behavior. A party unhappy with how a contract turns out may argue 
to a court that the contract in fact means something different according to 
the “private” course of dealings and understandings between the contracting 
parties. Where few objective indicia exist on this “private” meaning, courts 
will have difficulty in distinguishing between situations where the parties 
agreed ex ante to vary the contract with situations where one party ex post 
simply makes such a claim to nullify an unfavorable contract.84 
b. Industry Custom 
When standardized terms are first drafted, the original drafting parties 
will know what the terms mean, what contingencies the terms are supposed 
to address, and how different terms relate to one another (for example, in 
case of conflict, which term trumps). Although the scholarship on the proc-
esses that lead to the emergence of standardized terms is limited, we know 
that even the most sophisticated markets generally take time before they can 
coordinate and agree to adopt a new standard term. In other words, at the 
point of adoption, there is likely to be maximal knowledge and understand-
ing in the market about what the term was intended to mean.85 Just as 
importantly, the original adopting parties will also have a sense of what con-
tingencies their terms do not address.  
As the standardized terms spread through numerous contracts, later con-
tracting parties will often simply adopt the terms with the implicit 
assumption that the terms (often coming as a package with other standard-
ized terms) are “efficient.” Why else would others use the terms? With the 
passage of time, the assumption that the terms are efficient—while perhaps 
justified at the time of the first use of the terms and the initial dispersion of 
the terms throughout the marketplace—becomes more problematic. Market 
participants, nonetheless, may cling to the assumption about efficiency for 
extended periods of time. It bears emphasizing that a key assumption is that 
this is a world where disputes over the meanings of provisions are rare.  
                                                                                                                      
 84. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 585–86. Schwartz and Scott therefore advocate a 
textualist approach to contract interpretation to prevent such “private” understandings from receiv-
ing any interpretive weight unless explicitly included in the contract language at the time the 
contract is entered into. See id. Our proposal, in contrast, gives no weight to the private understand-
ings of the specific contracting parties and thus is less vulnerable to strategic behavior on the part of 
any one set of contracting parties. 
 85. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 37, at 937; cf. Richard A. Epstein, Confusion About Cus-
tom: Disentangling Informal Custom from Standard Contractual Provisions, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
821, 824 (1999) (noting, in his comment on Lisa Bernstein’s article, supra note 18, the many years 
it took the various trade associations to convert their industry customs into unified codes that then 
often became standard contracts).  
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The assumption of efficiency may lead contracting parties to expend few 
resources in discussing or investigating such boilerplate terms.86 Instead, 
attorneys will uncritically include the terms in all their contracts. Paradoxi-
cally, the assumption that the terms are efficient produces an equilibrium 
where no one knows what the terms mean (and what contingencies are ad-
dressed and not addressed by the terms), thereby calling into question 
whether such terms in fact are efficient for the contracting parties. 
By contrast, Goetz and Scott, in their 1985 article, portray market under-
standings of these terms as improving over time.87 Over time, the terms get 
used, resulting in the removal of errors, ambiguities, and incompleteness.88 
For such terms, the implication of this high level of understanding at which 
the market eventually arrives is that the history of the term should be irrele-
vant in contract interpretation.89 Our Article, however, is about the standard-
form terms that do not get frequently “used” in the sense of there being fre-
quent and public disputes where divergent views are aired and common 
understandings are cemented. There is an initial point in time when these 
terms are generally agreed upon and inserted into standard-form contracts. 
But then decades can go by without the terms being used, during which 
market understandings can vanish. Where current market understandings are 
absent, the history of the term becomes important in its interpretation. The 
majority of terms in standard sovereign and corporate bond contracts are, 
for example, reused without much notice or attention.  
With clauses whose understandings have been forgotten, neither context 
about the parties themselves nor current industry custom is likely to be use-
ful. The context that needs to be unearthed is a different beast—it is 
historical context. Moreover, even if courts are able to determine a current 
industry custom, it is unclear how much weight to place on this custom. At 
the time a term is drafted, all affected parties will pay relatively more atten-
tion to the meaning of the term. In contrast, after the passage of time, not all 
affected parties will pay as much attention to the term. Industry participants 
will simply ignore most boilerplate terms. Any custom that exists, therefore, 
is unlikely to represent the full array of interests in the industry.90  
                                                                                                                      
 86. The classic articulation of the efficiency paradox comes from Grossman and Stiglitz, 
who were demonstrating the circularity of the efficient capital markets hypothesis. Their insight was 
that the very assumption of efficiency meant that no one would have an incentive to look for arbi-
trage opportunities (because embedded in the efficiency assumption is a no-arbitrage assumption). 
But the market can only arrive at efficiency if market players look for arbitrages and eliminate them. 
See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 393, 404 (1980). 
 87. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 64, at 287; see also Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Prefer-
entum: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1105, 1112 (asserting that the 
understanding of terms improves over time). 
 88. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 64, at 287. 
 89. Epstein, making the same assumption about perfect market understandings of standard-
form terms, writes that “[t]hese provisions should be construed as written, wholly without reference 
to the fractured history of their origins.” Epstein, supra note 85, at 831. 
 90. Likewise, if courts are able to uncover a course of dealings or performance between a 
specific set of contracting parties, applying this to interpret a boilerplate term is problematic. Be-
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The problem with appealing to contemporaneous industry custom to as-
sist in the interpretation of longstanding boilerplate terms is different from 
the problems identified by Lisa Bernstein with relying on industry custom in 
the U.C.C. context.91 Bernstein reports that in several commercial industries, 
including the hay, textile, and silk industries, trade associations often failed 
to come to a consensus in developing trade rules. While local customs ex-
isted, there were often conflicts in understandings, and trade associations 
frequently failed to put forward nationwide usages and meanings.92 And 
when they did succeed, the process often took multiple decades.93 In a sense, 
the context we are interested in is the half of the process that Bernstein does 
not analyze. That is, what happens after industry custom gets reduced to a 
standard-form provision and when it becomes a default rule.94 The issue that 
motivates us is that the robust understanding of the standard-form provision 
that may have taken the market years to develop can then get forgotten.  
Just as Bernstein identifies disagreement over the meaning of custom in 
the pre-standard-form-provision period, we find in our pari passu case (and 
predict more generally) that disagreement over the meaning of that stan-
dard-form contract can arise subsequently because the meaning that 
everyone thinks they understand can then get lost in the sands of time. The 
difference, for purposes of contract interpretation, between our situation and 
that which Bernstein’s paper addresses is the following: Unlike where trade 
associations failed to establish nationwide customary meanings in an indus-
try, the lack of any current industry customary meaning for boilerplate terms 
due to the passage of time leaves courts with an important alternative source 
of interpretive authority. As we argue later, courts may look to the historical 
context of the term—that is, the point at which disagreements over custom 
were settled and a standard-form provision arose—to determine the original 
meaning of the drafters.95  
Bernstein also notes that many gaps in custom also relate to remote con-
tingencies that trade associations and industry participants find too costly to 
                                                                                                                      
cause a boilerplate term is designed to cover an entire industry or trade, the specific course of deal-
ings or performance among any idiosyncratic set of parties is unlikely to maximize the interests of 
the industry or trade. 
 91. See Bernstein, supra note 18. 
 92. See id. at 717–46. Bernstein further emphasizes that the mid-to-late-nineteenth-century 
and the early-twentieth-century industries which she examined were particularly conducive to the 
development of national trade customs. See id. at 715. 
 93. For example, the National Hay Association took eleven years or more to decide on the 
definition of a contract carload. The National Grain and Feed Association took more than twenty 
years to promulgate its Feed Trade Rules. And the textile trade took approximately eighteen years to 
produce its Worth Street Rules. See id. at 719–20, 723 n.44, 725–29, 732; see also Epstein, supra 
note 85, at 824 (citing Bernstein’s evidence on this point).  
 94. Richard Epstein’s comment on Bernstein’s article makes the distinction between the pre-
standard-form period, where understandings of custom are in flux, and the post-standard-form pe-
riod that Bernstein’s article does not address. Epstein, supra note 85, at 824. Epstein though, seems 
to assume that once custom morphs into a standard form, the understandings of what the standard-
form term means will remain. Id. 
 95. Once courts emphasize historical meaning, the original standard setters will have an 
incentive to record and preserve the meaning behind boilerplate terms. 
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address.96 Boilerplate terms, in contrast, do not present necessarily remote 
contingencies. Ambiguity may arise even in major contingencies, such as 
the interaction of the pari passu clause with the sovereigns’ ability to make 
preferential payments to the IMF and other world organizations, simply due 
to the passage of time and the corresponding loss of meaning with time. For 
widely prevalent boilerplate terms, finding a consistent and industry-wide 
method of resolving interpretation issues, such as referring to the historical 
context of terms, greatly affects the welfare of all contracting parties in the 
industry. 
B. Guessing at Welfare Maximization 
If neither the textual nor the contextual approach yields answers, then a 
third option is for the court to attempt a welfare-maximizing estimate for 
what the parties must have wanted from the clause. This is what Judge Win-
ter attempted in the Sharon Steel case, where he recognized that he was 
dealing with boilerplate terms and the related need to defer to market under-
standings with these types of terms.97 Since there was no market 
understanding readily available to him though, Winter simply estimated 
what the two sides might have been looking for in negotiating this clause.  
As with textual analysis, the court that attempts to divine a welfare-
maximizing solution is misunderstanding the nature of boilerplate. The 
value of the clause to the parties is in the historical context that it brings 
with it. The parties may not know what that historical learning is, but they 
use the clause because they want the benefit of history. In performing the 
value-maximizing guess, the court is throwing away the historical context 
and guessing at a solution, leading to a high possibility of error.  
C. Dealing with Court Errors 
Ill-advised attempts on the part of courts to interpret boilerplate terms 
with standard contract interpretation techniques may result in a market re-
sponse. The market can respond in two ways. First, it can reprice the 
contracts for the new meaning that courts have provided. Second, it can re-
vise the language in existing contracts to communicate to the courts that the 
understanding that the parties have is different from the one that the courts 
articulated. In theory, these market responses can ameliorate the costs of 
court interpretation attempts. But there are reasons to expect that ameliora-
tion will be minimal in practice.  
                                                                                                                      
 96. See Bernstein, supra note 18, at 747. 
 97. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 
1982).  
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D. Pricing Response 
In theory, if parties understand a standard provision to mean X, but a 
court reinterprets it to mean Y, the market price of all contracts will simply 
adjust to take into account the new meaning.98 Even if this pricing adjust-
ment does take place, there remains the problem that the parties wanted their 
contract to mean X, not Y. So, with pari passu for example, neither the 
debtor nor the majority of creditors likely wanted a contract provision that 
would make it harder for the country to obtain emergency financing from 
the IMF. In other words, the new interpretation was value-reducing for both 
sides. Even with the possibility of a price response, uncertainty costs re-
main. The fact that some local court in Brussels asserts an interpretation 
does not make it universally accepted. This uncertainty can be priced, but 
once again, it is a cost that the parties would prefer to avoid. In sum, a pric-
ing response by the market still leaves the parties with significant costs.  
E. Language-Clarification Response  
If courts misinterpret some customized clause between parties, parties 
can supposedly correct it because they know what they want their clause to 
say. When the market responds through the creation of new terms more in 
line with the market’s understanding, all subsequent contracts will avoid the 
negative effects of an ill-advised court interpretation. An immediate market 
response may also help signal to other courts that the prior court’s decision 
was contrary to the market’s understanding of that boilerplate term.99 Such a 
response may cut off further litigation or at least ensure that future interpre-
tations are closer to the market understandings.  
If the market functioned well in responding to court interpretations of 
boilerplate terms, the social cost of remaining with the present contract in-
terpretation doctrine would be low. But with boilerplate clauses, dispersed 
market participants may lack the ability to coordinate, at least initially, to 
clarify the language in subsequently adopted terms. Market participants may 
also hesitate to correct terms out of a fear that a scattered, non-unified at-
tempt at clarification may increase the likelihood of further unfavorable 
court rulings.  
Scholars have observed that boilerplate contract terms display features 
of network externalities.100 The more terms of a specific type that are used, 
                                                                                                                      
 98. See, e.g., Boardman, supra note 87, at 1118. 
 99. One may wonder how a court is to determine when a market has in fact made a decided 
shift in contract terms. Courts see only the subset of contracts that end up in litigation, a subset that 
may not be representative of the group of all contract terms in use. Posner provides that 
“[a]cademics can conduct the necessary inquiry into the negation rate.” Posner, supra note 3, at 
1589. Running an academic study, however, can take years and academics often lack access to the 
full range of contracts used in an industry or trade. 
 100. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow 
of the International Order, 53 Emory L.J. 691, 710 (2004); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 39, at 
729–35; Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. 
Rev. 757, 774–75 (1995). 
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the greater is the likelihood that the term will receive court scrutiny and, as a 
result, greater legal clarity in meaning. Attorneys are also more likely to 
draft other terms complementary in operation with more common terms. 
Other reasons for “sticky” contract terms exist. Contracting parties must 
balance several goals in entering into a contract. Parties will desire terms 
that maximize their return from the contract. Parties in certain contexts may 
also care about the speed with which a deal is completed and the speed of 
transactions will be higher, other things equal, if every transaction occurs 
under the same uniform code that no single party can alter unilaterally.101 In 
the sovereign bond context, for example, speed matters in the placing of a 
new bond issue. Sovereigns typically will issue new bond deals when inter-
est rates are favorable and will not wish to delay out of a fear that the 
interest rates may shift unfavorably.  
Additionally, once the market comes to an equilibrium of quick deals, 
any deal that results in a delay will result in investors searching for other 
deals. Delay may result from information asymmetries. When a sovereign 
proposes new, non-standard terms, delay may result as investors puzzle over 
the new term (or simply jump ship to another deal). One side negotiating a 
contract may not be sure of the motives of the other side or the penchant of 
the other side to act litigious or difficult about the performance or interpreta-
tion of contract terms into the future. Calling attention to a particular 
boilerplate term may signal to the other side that one is perhaps acting op-
portunistically or is potentially difficult to deal with. Rather then send such 
a signal, parties may choose to leave a boilerplate term as-is, even if the 
term is not optimal for the parties’ situation. Keeping the contract terms 
identical is important in the area of sovereign bond deals for this reason. 
Any change will result in investors stopping a bond offering in its tracks to 
investigate the reason for the change—anathema for issuers and underwrit-
ers eager for quick placement of the offering debt securities.102 
Another market failure that may result in a lack of response to contrac-
tual shocks is the dispersed nature of contracting parties in many industries. 
Many sovereigns typically will seek to issue bonds through no more than a 
single offering in any given year. Coordination among dispersed contracting 
parties may be difficult. As discussed in the pari passu example, an individ-
ual party negotiating a contract only internalizes the benefit from the 
specific contract. The party will ignore the benefit to other contracting par-
ties in various contexts from improving on a boilerplate term. The same lack 
of coordination may result in a non-uniform response to a court ruling inter-
preting any given boilerplate term. Rather than put forward a non-uniform 
response (with unpredictable response on the part of future courts), parties 
may simply choose not to change a boilerplate term. When coordination 
does eventually take place, it may take place so long after the initial court 
                                                                                                                      
 101. See Epstein, supra note 85, at 827. 
 102. For discussions of this negative signaling effect as a cause of contract stickiness, see 
Omri Ben-Shahar & John Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (forth-
coming 2006).  
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interpretive shock to the term that even a coordinated shift in the contract 
term may fail to convince the court that the market originally had a different 
understanding. As with the pari passu example, sophisticated parties may 
therefore coordinate instead around litigation strategy, submitting amicus 
briefs and publishing commentary to affect the public discourse, among 
other tactics. 
The market does not always respond to a court interpretive error with in-
action. In at least one instance, involving an important corporate bond term, 
the market did respond to an erroneous court interpretation. Bill Bratton 
documents such a coordinated move to correct the language in bond con-
tracts in the wake of the classic Fifth Circuit case of Broad v. Rockwell 
International Corp.103 The response, while faster than in the pari passu or 
CAC cases, nonetheless took several years.104 Even with the possibility of a 
market response, our point is that the present contract interpretation regime 
works to retard such a response. An alternative regime that focused first on 
the historical understandings of a term and accepted evidence from the 
range of market participants on this understanding would not create the 
same level of deterrence on market participants seeking to clarify terms in 
subsequent contracts. 
III. A Theory of Boilerplate Interpretation 
The fact that contracts, even those between sophisticated parties, are not 
always complete, failing to take into account every contingency and leaving 
ambiguities in language, has been long recognized. Parties may rationally 
choose not to expend scarce resources in clarifying every possible term 
when the possibility of a problem arising from the terms is low (and thus the 
discounted cost with having to deal with any conflict in meaning of a term is 
lower than the upfront cost of clarification at the time of contract drafting). 
Standard interpretation doctrine allows courts to play a gap-filling role 
and assess what the parties would have contracted had they considered the 
situation. Courts also look to the course of dealings and performance as evi-
dence of the intent of the specific set of contracting parties. Allowing courts 
to fill contract gaps ex post allows parties to focus on the more important 
provisions of their contracts ex ante, secure in the belief that even if a low 
probability contingency does occur and they end up in a contractual dispute, 
an impartial decisionmaker, the court, will ascertain a solution that provides 
value to all the contracting parties. Where upfront contracting costs are high 
and parties trust that courts will generally get things “right” in their gap-
filling in the low probability event that a term will lead to litigation, parties 
may rationally choose to leave terms ambiguous or unspecified (minimizing 
                                                                                                                      
 103. 642 F.2d 929, 961–62 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); see 
William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 
667, 687 n.75, 695 n.111. 
 104. Our evidence on this point is anecdotal.  
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the combined upfront negotiation and drafting costs and discounted dispute-
related costs associated with the contingency).105  
Where contracts are incomplete due to the high costs of drafting com-
plete contracts, there is reason to be cautious when asking courts to resolve 
ambiguities and engage in gap-filling for boilerplate terms used in sophisti-
cated markets. The lack of any intent on the part of contracting parties with 
respect to the boilerplate terms combined with the possibility that the spe-
cific parties before a court may not be representative of the industry 
heighten the risk of court error. Once a court error occurs, collective-action 
problems, combined with a fear of how courts will interpret a disjointed, 
non-uniform market response to a court interpretation of a boilerplate term, 
may lead market participants to delay modifying the term, seeking instead to 
mount a litigation strategy. Taking a formalist approach is unlikely to im-
prove on matters. Even when courts refuse to look beyond the text and take 
a hard line on ambiguous terms, specific contracting parties are unlikely to 
want to negotiate over the boilerplate term (this is why they chose to use a 
boilerplate term in the first place!) and even if they do so, may incur large 
duplicative costs across the industry.106 
Our observation that boilerplate terms are not the product of any actual 
meeting of the minds but instead are placed into contracts because such 
terms are used in most contracts (and thus are standardized) and seem to 
work (the paradox of efficiency) leads us to the contention that courts are 
approaching contract interpretation in exactly the backward fashion. These 
terms are not representations of the specific intent of the parties to the trans-
action. They are more like incantations, where the parties, by invoking the 
boilerplate language, avail themselves of the historical reasons for the sur-
vival of these terms in generations of contracts.107  
Unlike the focus of much of contract law scholarship on discerning the 
precise understanding of a particular set of contracting parties, courts should 
embrace the possibility that a general understanding for boilerplate terms is 
desirable. Interpretation should be akin to statutory interpretation—courts 
focus first on unearthing the original intent of the drafters and the historical 
context in which the terms were initially drafted. Taking a statutory ap-
proach to boilerplate enables courts to turn to an alternative, more expert 
source of interpretive authority, leading to a greater likelihood that the wel-
fare of contracting parties will be maximized. Under such an interpretive 
                                                                                                                      
 105. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1583.  
 106. Posner describes boilerplate terms as a private alternative to courts as “gap-fillers” for 
areas in a contract that the contracting parties find too remote a contingency or unimportant to ex-
pend valuable resources in negotiation. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1585. 
 107. In their 1985 article, Goetz and Scott also recognize that there will be certain terms 
whose value is in that they are invocations (or “talismanic”) that carry predefined legal meanings 
that are not readily discernable from looking at the terms themselves (these can be terms like 
“F.O.B”, “C.I.F”, and “as is”). Goetz & Scott, supra note 64, at 282–83, 300–01. The difference 
between our approach and that of Scott and Goetz, though, seems to be that they don’t see the mean-
ings of these terms getting forgotten over time. They recognize that there are certain express terms 
that the parties choose that are invocations. But, in the world Scott and Goetz describe, the market 
understands what these invocations are meant to connote. See id. at 282–83.  
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approach, industry standard-setting entities are more likely to organize and 
clarify existing boilerplate terms as well as draft new boilerplate terms for 
unaddressed contingencies. A statutory approach to contract interpretation 
also minimizes the influence of any one set of contract parties who happen 
to litigate over the meaning of a boilerplate term, and places greater weight 
on the industry-wide understanding. Treating boilerplate terms as statutes 
for purposes of interpretation also will lead to fewer court errors and a 
greater ability on the part of the market to correct for any errors that do oc-
cur.
108
  
If courts follow a statutory approach to interpreting boilerplate terms, to 
whom should courts look as the “legislative” body? Ideally, an industry as-
sociation would exist that incorporated the viewpoints of all the relevant 
players in the industry in every pronouncement and decision the industry 
association made on the meaning of boilerplate terms. Under this ideal, a 
court may simply defer completely to the interpretations of the industry-
wide association. Such an all-aggregating industry association, however, is 
unlikely to exist, at least with respect to every pronouncement and decision, 
whether formal or informal, coming from the association. While the formal 
promulgation of new terms are likely to represent the views of all member 
groups, ordinary press releases and other communications from the group 
not coming out of a formal deliberative process may not. 
Given the lack of an ideal legislative body, in this Part we set forth our 
proposal of how courts may implement a contract-as-statute approach to 
contract interpretation for boilerplate terms in sophisticated contracting 
situations. We would (A) allow parties to designate a standard-setting entity 
as the “legislative body” for a particular set of boilerplate provisions in a 
contract. Even if an ideal legislative body does not exist, courts may rely on 
sophisticated commercial parties in negotiating a contract to designate an 
entity that best serves the parties’ joint interests.  
Where parties do not designate a legislative standard setter, we (B) set 
forth an alternative set of contract interpretation steps, starting with histori-
cal evidence on the meaning of a boilerplate term and moving forward in 
time toward the market’s current understanding of the term. Importantly, we 
focus the court’s inquiry squarely on market-wide perceptions of the terms 
and not on the intent of any specific set of contracting parties before the 
court. We make the argument that an inquiry into the historical evidence and 
the intent of the original drafters comes closest to determining how an ideal 
legislative body would interpret a boilerplate term.  
We then discuss (C) how a contract-as-statute approach to interpretation 
will affect the incentives of standard-setting entities to form in an industry. 
We lastly (D) examine how boilerplate terms change the nature of contracts 
                                                                                                                      
 108. We do not mean to suggest that contract law should incorporate the entire debate over 
statutory interpretation. Indeed, we recognize that there is a strain of statutory interpretation that 
prescribes strict textualism and abhors historical inquiry into legislative intent. Our point instead is 
to suggest that, at least in the boilerplate context, it is worth having the kinds of debates over textu-
alism versus historical understandings versus contemporary understandings that take place in the 
statutory context.  
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from a single document, representing a meeting of the minds of a set of con-
tracting parties, to a compilation of several different sources of authority 
(consisting of varied boilerplate provisions drawn from different sources). 
A. The Designated Legislative Body 
What does it mean to view boilerplate terms more like statutes? First, 
contracting parties should have the ability to designate a standard-setting 
entity to provide a definitive source of interpretive authority for the contract. 
Put differently, the presumption that the state (through its courts) stands at 
the top of the interpretive hierarchy needs to be altered.109 Even in the ab-
sence of an ideal legislative body capable of incorporating the interests of all 
relevant industry participants for any given decision, sophisticated contract-
ing parties may find close alternatives. ISDA, for example, provides a close 
approximation in the swaps and derivatives markets. Courts may use the 
selection on the part of sophisticated parties of ISDA, or some other entity, 
as their designated legislative entity as evidence of the parties’ revealed be-
lief that selecting the designated legislative entity to interpret future contract 
ambiguities will result in fewer uncertainties and errors than relying on 
court-based interpretation. 
Such a designation would require courts to adopt the interpretation of 
the designated standard setter, even if provided after the same court has in-
terpreted the term differently in prior litigation, for terms that are part of 
contracts negotiated in the past. This “legislative” designation would allow 
the third party to revise constantly the meaning of boilerplate terms not only 
for contracts negotiated in the future but also all previously negotiated con-
tracts. The boilerplate term parts of contracts no longer would reflect a 
particular snapshot of time but rather form a network of dynamic terms, 
changing flexibly with the needs of the market or in reaction to ill-advised 
court interpretations of boilerplate. When a court gets an interpretation of a 
term incorrect, the designated legislative source could simply correct the 
interpretation, affecting not only subsequent but all pre-existing contracts, 
that we argue courts should take as conclusive. 
Where the market has a pool of existing contracts containing boilerplate 
terms, dealing with uncertainties in the terms (and correcting for court mis-
takes in interpreting terms) is particularly difficult. Contract doctrine views 
each contract as a separately negotiated meeting of the minds. Under this 
view, even if parties subsequently decide to change a term’s meaning for 
subsequent contracts, there is no presumption (indeed there is a presumption 
against) changing the meaning for prior, already negotiated contracts. Treat-
ing each contract as a separate instrument for purposes of contract 
interpretation is justifiable where each contract in fact does represent a new 
meeting of the minds. But where specific terms are boilerplate and included 
because the “market” requires them in a pool of contracts, the meeting-of-
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arguing for it to be altered, albeit in a somewhat different context).  
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the-minds rationale breaks down. Attempting to discern a specific intent can 
introduce a degree of randomness into how boilerplate terms are interpreted, 
leading to interpretive shocks such as the case of the pari passu clause.  
Importantly, present contract law does not appear sympathetic to the 
possibility of allowing parties to opt into a separate body of terms in a con-
tract agreed to at a particular point in time that may change in the future 
pursuant to actions taken by a third-party standard-setting body. This lack of 
sympathy, we suspect, stems from the view that each contract represents a 
meeting of the minds of the particular set of contracting parties at the time 
when the contract is signed.110 Swap contracts that incorporate ISDA terms, 
for example, incorporate only a snapshot of the ISDA terms current as of the 
date of the contract itself. If ISDA changes its terms or definitions, these 
changes only come into effect for subsequent contracts. Under this interpre-
tive approach, similar boilerplate contracts in an industry take on a “wine”-
like character, with the meaning of different contracts dependent on the 
“vintage” of the boilerplate terms to which they refer.  
Providing a mechanism for market-based bodies to change the meaning 
of standardized terms not only for subsequent contracts but also for the pool 
of pre-existing contracts would give several benefits for contracting parties. 
First, the risk of mistaken court interpretations is lessened. If a court pro-
vides an interpretation of a boilerplate term that affects the entire market, 
private standard-setting bodies may simply change the term for all pre-
existing as well as subsequent contracts. Second, an expert industry associa-
tion would have the ability to fine tune terms, correct prior mistakes in 
drafting, and respond to changing market conditions. Parties ex ante that 
realize the risk of misinterpretation is reduced may rely more on such boi-
lerplate provisions and reduce any premiums for the reduced level of risk, 
lowering overall contracting transactions costs. Our proposal bears similari-
ties to Llewellyn’s call for merchant juries to assist courts ex post in 
interpreting industry-related terms.111 The U.C.C. ultimately did not adopt 
Llewellyn’s notion of merchant juries.112 We would go one step further than 
Llewellyn, allowing parties not only to designate a third party to interpret 
ambiguous terms in the contract into the future but also to rewrite even clear 
terms in the contract. 
Because several contracts can use the same boilerplate terms and make 
the same legislative delegation, a standard setter given the “legislative” au-
thority to determine the meaning of terms may change in one stroke the 
collective market meaning of terms. This allows for quick adjustments to the 
meaning of a term that applies consistently across an industry. Consistency 
                                                                                                                      
 110. See id. at 547 (“[C]urrent law . . . holds that interpretation is an issue for courts to decide 
and should be conducted according to rules that parties cannot vary.”). Scott and Schwartz argue that 
the method of court interpretation should be made a default, allowing parties to opt out of the de-
fault. Unlike our proposal, however, they argue that the majoritarian default would be to adopt a 
strict formalist interpretation approach. See id. at 569. 
 111. See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant 
Rules, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 465, 527–29 (1987).  
 112. See id. 
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is important both to minimize the amount of conflict that may arise and to 
facilitate transactions involving the contract in the secondary aftermarket. 
Where speed is important in completing a contract, such as in the sovereign 
debt market, consistency allows parties to focus only on the subset of terms 
(typically pricing terms) where the parties are likely to disagree. In contrast, 
if one court interprets a particular contract, uncertainty will arise whether a 
second court will follow the first court’s interpretation for another contract 
with the same boilerplate terms. The arising uncertainty may cause the dis-
count buyers of such contracts to demand compensation for the risk they 
face that courts may change the meaning of the terms away from what they 
expect.  
How likely is it that parties would opt into a designated legislative 
standard-setter approach to contractual boilerplate? Parties in certain 
markets already explicitly opt to use a set of pre-existing definitional terms 
provided through third parties. Swap contracts today make explicit reference 
to the ISDA definitions in the Short-Form Confirmation sheets containing 
the economic terms of an agreement. Parties need only agree to follow the 
terms of a particular standard setter (without negotiating the specific terms) 
when they opt into a pool of standardized terms.  
How courts interpret boilerplate terms affects the incentives for a stan-
dard-setting body to arise in an industry and the activities that such a 
standard-setting body undertakes. Various reasons exist for a standard-
setting entity not to arise in an industry, as discussed above.113 On the mar-
gin, nonetheless, changing court interpretation of boilerplate terms will 
provide greater incentives for industry-wide standard setters to organize and 
provide boilerplate provisions. Under the current regime, courts will look to 
how a standard setter defines a specific term only if such definitions are in-
corporated into a specific contract. Otherwise, each contract is treated as a 
separately negotiated instrument even if it contains boilerplate provisions. 
Even where definitions from a standard-setting body are used in a contract, 
the current interpretive regime imposes several large costs on such standard 
setters.  
First, courts will not look to what a standard-setting body does subse-
quent to the formation of a particular contract as a definitive source for the 
interpretation of that specific contract. While a fast-moving market may re-
quire a change in how a particular term is used, the present lack of doctrinal 
support deters a standard-setting body from doing so for the stock of exist-
ing contracts. Second, because each contract is ultimately viewed as a 
representation of the meeting of minds between a specific set of contracting 
parties, these parties will have the ability to bring forward their own extrin-
sic evidence on what they thought a particular boilerplate term meant, 
trumping even the views of the standard-setting body. Where the specific 
contracting parties are different (at least ex post at the litigation stage) from 
the universe of potential users of a boilerplate term, they may thus skew the 
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interpretation of a boilerplate term. At the very least, parties will face 
greater uncertainty in how courts will interpret the term. 
While standard-setting bodies thus may find it worthwhile to generate 
boilerplate standards and definitions for a particular industry, the benefit 
they provide (and thus the return they can make from developing boilerplate 
terms) is truncated by the present contract interpretation regime. Taking a 
statutory approach to boilerplate interpretation would ameliorate these costs, 
thereby raising the return for standard-setting groups to generate boilerplate 
terms in a greater number of industries with sophisticated parties. 
Significantly, the delegation of authority to a third party to interpret am-
biguous contract terms only changes to whom contracting parties delegate 
authority. Already the (mandatory) default is that courts interpret the mean-
ing of contracts for parties well after the contract is agreed upon. As shown 
in the pari passu example, this authority on the part of courts can lead to 
drastic ex post deviations from the ex ante understanding of the contracting 
parties. Our proposal simply shifts the locus of interpretive authority away 
from courts and toward standard-setting bodies in the industry to whom the 
contracting parties agree to delegate interpretive authority at the time of 
contracting. Shifts in how terms in pre-existing contracts are interpreted 
may still occur—but now these changes are explicitly taken into account by 
the contracting parties in designating an expert third party to guide these 
changes rather than through the decentralized, non-expert rulings of courts. 
One possible criticism of our proposal is that industry association 
groups, while containing greater expertise, may not have the best interests of 
all contracting parties in mind. It is unclear, however, what motivates courts 
in interpreting contracts; courts internalize none of the interests in the indus-
try. As well, a market incentive will exist for a designated legislative body to 
work in the best interests of all in the industry. If a standard setter does not 
take into account the joint interests of the market participants in the industry, 
few new contracts would delegate authority to the standard setter. The dele-
gation of authority on the part of sophisticated contracting parties at the time 
of their contract provides, in our minds, presumptive evidence of the value 
of the standard setter to all sides of the contract. 
One could also imagine conditional delegation of authority, granting leg-
islative powers to a standard-setting entity only so long as the entity 
contains a specific proportion of members of a particular type (for example, 
swap industry professional intermediaries in the case of ISDA). Alterna-
tively, parties could conditionally delegate authority to entities only to the 
extent the entity engages in a specified, formal deliberative process that is 
inclusive of all interests in the industry in determining what to do with con-
tract ambiguities. Contracting parties may worry that a standard-setting 
entity to which they give their trust could change over time and no longer 
represent their best interests. These forms of conditional delegation of au-
thority provide assurance to the contracting parties that the entity will 
continue, through time, to represent their particular interests. Partial delega-
tion of authority is also possible, giving courts the authority to interpret 
relatively plain language terms but giving residual authority to interpret 
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more ambiguous provisions to an industry standard setter. A standard-setting 
entity may reduce the fears that the entity may, in the future, no longer rep-
resent the interests of all members in an industry with a detailed, specified 
contract. Where matters are clear, courts would interpret such a provision, 
turning to the standard-setting entity in the future only for contingent issues 
left unresolved by the plain language of the term. 
Another criticism of our proposal is that arbitration already provides 
parties an ability to bypass court interpretations of boilerplate clauses. In 
some ways, arbitration is similar to our proposal, allowing a third-party or-
ganization the ability to substitute its interpretative authority in place of 
court-based interpretation. For at least three reasons, however, arbitration is 
inferior to a system that forces courts to pay legislative-like deference to a 
third party source of interpretive authority. 
First, arbitration is costly. Rather than incur the cost of establishing an 
arbitration system, a third-party standard setter may wish to have courts in-
terpret future ambiguities subject to deference to the association’s 
interpretations, if any. Court-based resolution of conflicts provides a subsidy 
to a third-party group seeking to draft and refine boilerplate terms for an 
industry.114 So long as the courts pay appropriate deference to the intent of 
the third-party group, as we advocate where the contracting parties specify 
the third-party group as a “legislative body,” the availability of court-based 
adjudication allows the third-party group to focus its attention and resources 
on developing terms that provide the greatest surplus for contracting parties. 
Second, parties may not be sure how long a particular third-party group 
may stay in existence. If boilerplate terms are used in contracts after the 
third-party group ceases to exist, the possibility of arbitration may disappear 
with the group. Court-based dispute resolution does not suffer from this 
same risk. Moreover, even if a third-party organization dissolves, courts may 
still apply deference to the intent of the organization at the time the boiler-
plate terms were originally drafted in interpreting ambiguous terms. 
Third, arbitration involves a different form of interpretation. Interpreta-
tion that occurs through arbitration is relatively informal and decentralized. 
Individual arbitrators make their own decision with respect to the meaning 
of specific contract clauses. Parties may not wish third-party organizations 
to interpret clauses in this fashion. Where parties are uncertain about the 
motives of a third-party organization (particularly over time), the parties 
may wish future interpretations to take place only through a broad, industry-
wide deliberative process. Such a process is more visible in the industry 
and, as a result, is more likely to generate criticisms if unbalanced in favor 
of a particular subset of the industry. Relying on court-based interpretation 
that pays deference only to industry-wide pronouncements by a designated 
legislative third-party body provides an incentive for such groups to work 
through more collective and visible means in clarifying and generating new 
boilerplate terms. 
                                                                                                                      
 114. Of course, from an overall societal viewpoint, this subsidy is not cost free. 
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B. Interpretation  
What if parties make no such legislative designation in their contracts 
(as is the case in all boilerplate terms in use today)? Our second insight is 
that courts, when faced with the interpretation of boilerplate, should attempt 
to construct how an industry-wide legislative body would have interpreted 
the boilerplate term, an approach distinct from constructing what the spe-
cific contracting parties would have done. Taking an industry-wide view 
ensures that courts do not place undue weight on the individual contracting 
parties before them. An industry-wide view also increases the likelihood that 
other courts taking a similar approach will come to similar results, leading 
to greater certainty in the marketplace on the meaning of the boilerplate 
terms.  
How should a court construct what an industry-wide legislative body 
would have provided for in an ambiguous boilerplate provision? The start-
ing point in an analysis of general market understanding should be the 
historical understandings of a boilerplate clause, discerning the intent of the 
original drafters of the term.115 This understanding includes direct evidence 
of the intent of the drafters, such as memoranda detailing the purpose. The 
historical record also includes how boilerplate terms fit into the overall 
structure of the contract envisioned by the original drafters.  
Much like the enacting legislative body for a statute, the original draft-
ing parties provide the best source of information on the original meaning of 
boilerplate contract terms. The original drafting parties will have spent the 
most time and resources in negotiating the contract term (and thus represent 
a true “meeting of the minds”).116 In a market populated with sophisticated 
parties on all sides, the drafting parties necessarily must balance the inter-
ests of all sides for a contract term to gain at least initial widespread 
acceptance in the industry.117 The fact that a boilerplate term gains initial 
acceptance in a market consisting solely of sophisticated parties provides 
some evidence as to the value of the term for all parties.118 The drafters will 
                                                                                                                      
 115. Such an activity, while difficult, is often feasible even for terms that are over a century in 
existence. For example, Lee Buchheit, the leading U.S. commentator on the meaning of sovereign 
debt contract terms, and his colleague, Jeremy Pam, embarked on a largely successful historical 
excavation of the pari passu clause’s past. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 15, at 891–914. 
 116. To be clear, the “original drafting parties” referred to in the text are those who first adopt 
the clause as a standard provision. That same clause or some version of it may have been used years 
prior in idiosyncratic circumstances. But it is not the intentions of those idiosyncratic parties we are 
interested in. Given that the goal is to discern the intentions underlying standard or boilerplate pro-
visions, one has to go back to the point at which the clause becomes standardized. And that point 
should be fairly easy to discern, given that there is likely to be some big event (war, large financial 
crisis, revolution, oil shortage, etc.) that causes everyone to focus on the need to alter the existing 
standard forms.  
 117. Once a standardized term becomes entrenched, the very fact that a term is the standard 
may promote its continued use. And, as we discuss above, see supra Section II.A.2.b, parties may 
eventually forget the meanings of the terms, simply incorporating them into their contracts as an 
automatic matter. 
 118. Once a term becomes standardized, parties may adopt the boilerplate term without much 
analysis.  
CHOI & GULATI FTP2.DOC 2/16/2006 8:31 AM 
1168 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:1129 
 
also enjoy an expertise advantage over any court attempting to interpret a 
term. Courts looking to the historical record will increase the chance that a 
court interpretation will better match the needs of the marketplace.  
To the extent a historical record exists, a doctrine of deferring to this re-
cord also encourages consistency across different courts interpreting the 
same boilerplate provision. Varying parties in different litigation may have 
idiosyncratic views of what a particular boilerplate term means. Different 
courts, likewise, may come out with divergent opinions on what maximizes 
the welfare of any particular set of contracting parties. The historical record 
provides a common and fixed evidentiary source of the meaning of the term 
across different litigation. Referring to this source first will minimize the 
importance of idiosyncratic factors in separate litigation while stressing the 
common element of the boilerplate terms. 
One difficulty with looking to the historical understanding behind a boi-
lerplate term is the potential lack of connection behind the understanding 
and the particular context of the contracting parties that have chosen to 
adopt the boilerplate term (often without much thought on the terms). Why 
should it matter whether the drafters of a term from several decades in the 
past intended a pari passu term to prohibit non-equal payments to creditors? 
If the contracting parties had no intention one way or the other about allow-
ing non-equal payments, it is unclear why allowing the historical 
understanding to prevail will further the intent of the parties. Perversely, the 
original drafters may not necessarily have the best interests of all contract-
ing parties as their goal, instead adopting terms that systematically favor 
groups with greater power and influence in the industry. Once a term be-
comes standard in the industry, such terms may perpetuate themselves 
despite their one-sided nature.119 Nonetheless, advantages exist to relying on 
the historical understanding of boilerplate terms. 
First, making a clear historical understanding conclusive creates an in-
centive for the original drafters to create a record in the first place. Over 
time, a doctrine of deference to the historical record will lead to a greater 
amount of information on the initial intent of the drafters of such terms. 
Standard setters in an industry that provide such a record will increase the 
certainty and value of their terms, leading to a greater likelihood that their 
terms will become widespread in a particular industry and to more profit for 
the standard setters (or value for the entities that establish a non-profit stan-
dard setter). The record will also help flush out the motives of drafters. A 
record that states that the drafters intend specific boilerplate terms to result 
in outcomes that favor one set of contracting parties will make it more likely 
that other (sophisticated) sets of contracting parties will refuse to use the 
terms. Drafters could forego such a record, but at the risk that courts will not 
interpret the term as they had wished. 
Second, the probability that historical understanding may be outdated 
must be compared with the probability of court error in interpreting a boi-
lerplate contract using standard interpretive techniques. Of course, the 
                                                                                                                      
 119. See Bernstein, supra note 18, at 754–56.  
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farther back in time the historical understanding, the greater the likelihood 
of the understanding becoming outdated. For boilerplate terms, the cost of a 
court error differs depending on whether it uses a historical or standard con-
tract interpretation approach. When a court makes an error using standard 
contract interpretation techniques, the error is likely to chill a market re-
sponse. Because of the focus on the specific intent of the contracting parties, 
outside third parties (including industry groups) are unlikely to have much 
persuasive power over a single court as to the meaning of a term. Coordina-
tion over litigation may therefore take place at a later time and with less 
effort due to the lessened influence of outside, third party views on the in-
terpretation of a particular term. 
The standard approach to contract interpretation is also likely to chill a 
coordinated response to draft new terms that better reflect the market’s pref-
erences. As we discuss above, market participants may fear courts will 
misconstrue an uncoordinated response immediately after a court interpre-
tive shock as supporting the view that the interpretive shock correctly 
characterized the market’s prior understanding of a term. Market partici-
pants will hesitate to respond as a result. After the initial delay (sometimes 
taking years), a coordinated response may become possible as in the pari 
passu example. But by this time, even a coordinated change in the contract 
terms is unlikely to persuade a court that there existed a different market 
understanding from a now-prior court interpretation. Indeed, a market-wide 
shift after such a long delay may signal that the older pre-existing terms were 
in fact different from the new terms to which the market moves. Of course, 
courts could interpret a market-wide shift the other way. The key point here is 
that much uncertainty exists in how courts will react. Rather than run the risk 
of negatively affecting how courts will interpret a term contained in a large 
number of already outstanding contracts, market participants will not focus 
on clarifying the contract term language but instead focus on winning the 
litigation battle. 
In contrast, where courts take a historical approach to interpretation, the 
market response to a court error in interpretation is likely to differ. The his-
torical approach does not focus initially on how dispersed parties react to a 
prior court interpretation of a boilerplate term. Instead, the focus is on the 
historical understanding of the original drafters, giving parties greater lee-
way to clarify the language of contract terms adopted after the shock 
without fear that this change will be used to interpret pre-existing terms ad-
versely to the parties’ interests. The historical approach, as a result, allows 
market participants to develop new, clearer terms immediately after an in-
terpretive shock. 
We concede a cost to our approach. Markets often find it difficult and 
costly to put new boilerplate terms in place. Restricting courts to original in-
tent, that is, not giving legal recognition to evolving meaning, forces on 
parties the cost of being stuck with original meaning until resources can be 
coordinated to produce a market-wide shift. If, however, the result of our pro-
posal is the emergence of a standard setter that can engineer changes in 
boilerplate at a low cost, the problem is ameliorated. Plus, if the preservation 
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of historical understandings makes it easier for coordination around innova-
tions in language to take place, there is an additional ameliorative effect.  
C. Other Industry-Wide Sources of Authority 
In some situations, the task of determining the historical understanding 
of a boilerplate term is straightforward. Where an industry association exists 
that maintains a detailed set of boilerplate terms for use in the industry, the 
historical understanding is easily observable. Consider the meaning of the 
terms in the ISDA Master Agreement. Not only is ISDA present to clarify 
the meaning of its terms, but ISDA also publishes a detailed User’s Guide 
detailing the purpose and operation of its terms. In other situations, deter-
mining historical understandings is more difficult. A specific set of attorneys 
at an individual law firm many decades in the past may have crafted a par-
ticular clause. Over time, the term may become incorporated in a greater 
number of deals, traveling (through cut-and-paste) from contract to contract 
and law firm to law firm. As the term moves across firms and time, it may 
be subject to minor changes—word shifts, additional punctuation marks, 
one person’s sense of style replacing another’s. As we discuss above, with-
out a written record documenting the spread of a particular boilerplate term, 
as is absent in the sovereign bond context, the historical understandings will 
inevitably become lost.  
What if the historical record is either absent or ambiguous in meaning? 
Courts attempting to construct what an industry-wide standard setter would 
do should next turn to industry views on the meaning of the terms, placing 
greater weight on groups that aggregate the interests of a greater portion of 
the industry (and have reputational interests at stake). Courts should look to 
amicus briefs and other sources from industry groups and others providing 
evidence on the historical record. Even where an industry-wide group does 
not exist, but instead a court is faced with disparate views across the indus-
try, our approach will result in a better approximation of what maximizes 
the welfare of all industry participants compared with simply focusing on 
the specific contracting parties before a court.  
If an industry-wide aggregating body exists, why not presume that the 
body speaks for all contracting parties in the industry and defer to the 
group’s current understanding of the term without deference to historical 
understandings? Even where an industry aggregating body such as ISDA 
exists, turning to historical precedent first provides value. Historical prece-
dence may better comport with what contracting parties at the time thought 
they were getting in incorporating a boilerplate provision. Stressing histori-
cal precedence also places a burden on an aggregating entity to go through 
the formal process of putting forward new terms to change the historical 
precedent, creating a “focal” point for those in the industry. While a group 
such as ISDA may aggregate the interests of most members of an industry, 
going through the process of promulgating a new set of terms may heighten 
the awareness of the industry with respect to the process, ensuring greater 
participation of the range of industry participants in the redrafting process. 
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More industry participants may take notice if an industry association goes 
through the process of drafting a new set of model terms than if the associa-
tion puts out an opinion letter on the interpretation of pre-existing terms. 
Giving deference to the historical context and the intent of the original 
drafters also gives industry groups an incentive to draft new terms to resolve 
ambiguities. With the drafting of a new term, the industry group becomes 
the “original” drafter and, under our proposal, obtains primary deference 
from courts. Industry groups will also have an incentive to create a detailed 
record at the time they draft a new term on the meaning of the term to en-
sure that courts taking a statutory approach to interpreting boilerplate terms 
have a rich “legislative” history from which to find guidance. 
A criticism of our proposal might be that for many markets with boiler-
plate, there are no market-wide deliberative bodies that attempt to 
collectivize the interests of all (or even most) market participants. The pres-
ence (or absence) of trade associations and other groups, however, is 
endogenous. A shift in contract interpretation doctrine giving industry asso-
ciations more weight in the interpretation of standardized contract terms will 
result in more industry associations forming.  
In many industries, there already exist efforts to centralize the creation 
and modification of centralized terms. Consider again ISDA. When swap 
derivative contracts first came onto the financial scene, a large variety of 
terms and contracts arose in the marketplace. The variety, however, led to 
uncertainty in the precise meaning of terms. Industry participants worked to 
centralize the definition of key terms through the creation of ISDA. ISDA 
today provides a glossary of standardized terms. Contracting parties may 
then reference the ISDA terms as part of their contracts, incorporating by 
reference the contemporaneous ISDA definitions into their contract. 
Not all industries will have a clear, aggregating industry body such as 
ISDA. In such industries, courts must determine which industry groups or 
associations to look to in interpreting contracts. At first glance, this seems a 
formidable problem. Where one dominant group arises (such as ISDA) that 
all market participants look to, then a court may simply look to this domi-
nant group. But what if competing groups arise? And what if some groups 
systematically favor certain market participants (for example, investors over 
issuers or vice versa)? Where such groups are able to agree on the meaning 
of boilerplate terms, nonetheless, such an agreement allows courts to find 
interpretations that increase the value of market participants while removing 
courts directly from the decisionmaking process on the exact meaning of 
terms. Looking to historical precedence also mitigates the problem of multi-
ple competing groups. Courts look only second to the opinion of industry 
groups. Where more than one such group exists, or if the sole group does 
not represent the interests of all the participants in the industry, then a court 
may give less weight to the opinions of such competing groups. 
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D. The Disaggregated Contract 
A primary advantage of the historical approach to interpreting boiler-
plate is the emphasis on looking to the intent of the original drafters of a 
particular boilerplate clause. The focus on sources outside of the particular 
contract and contracting parties provides a new way of looking at the con-
tract as a whole. Rather than one cohesive document, negotiated at one 
singular point in time, a contract containing boilerplate language is a con-
glomeration of different pieces. Each piece may have a different history and 
timing. 
We saw in the example involving Mexico’s shift from UAC to CAC 
terms that different boilerplate terms in the same contract may be in conflict 
with one another. A historical boilerplate analysis recognizes that contradic-
tory provisions can exist, especially where one provision is a recent addition 
and another is a historical hold over. To the extent the two contradict each 
other, the provision more recent in time would be held to trump because it 
was clearly intended to replace the other older provision.  
We hypothesize that the lawyers for Mexico were so focused on altering 
the modification provisions from unanimity to 75%, that they failed to 
notice that there were other portions of the contract that were inconsistent 
with that move. Unearthing a historical understanding of the Obligations 
Absolute term would reveal it to be a remnant of the UAC provision; 
something that the prospectus and other sale documents clearly indicate was 
meant to be modified and replaced by the 75% term. A strict textual and 
traditional analysis would neither allow for consideration of when the terms 
arose as a matter or history or consideration of information in the prospectus 
(the latter not being considered to be part of the contract). But, to recognize 
the reality of how these documents evolve and how certain terms can get 
forgotten but nevertheless retained in the contracts will help courts reach a 
more accurate understanding of the reality of what the contract is intended 
to mean.  
Conclusion 
The standard approach to contract interpretation in the context of com-
mercial boilerplate terms generates perverse results and diminishes the 
incentives of market participants to generate new terms and clarify the 
meaning of existing boilerplate terms. If the market corrected for court mis-
takes quickly, such errors would impose little cost. However, dispersed 
contracting parties may take time to coordinate in an effort to put forward 
new contract terms. The presence of ongoing litigation may chill the incen-
tives of parties to draft new terms, shifting the focus of any coordinated 
efforts onto affecting the litigation itself.  
In response to these problems, we propose a new approach to contract 
interpretation for commercial boilerplate terms. Under our approach, courts 
would interpret boilerplate terms similarly with statutes. Where parties ex-
plicitly opt to select an industry standard setter to act as the authoritative 
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interpretive source, courts should simply defer to this standard setter. Where 
parties do not explicitly opt for a standard setter but nonetheless use well-
worn boilerplate terms, courts should follow a similar contract-as-statute 
approach in interpretation. Under such an approach, courts should look to 
the intent of the original drafters of the boilerplate term and the historical 
context of the usage of the term.  
Taking a statutory approach toward interpreting commercial boilerplate 
allows courts to rethink the nature of any one contract. Instead of a single 
document created at one moment in time when contracting parties arrive at a 
meeting of the minds, a contract with boilerplate terms represents a mixture 
of different components, each with potentially different timing at which ac-
tual agreement (by the initial drafters) on the meaning was determined. 
Courts may take advantage of this differential timing, resolving conflicts 
between different boilerplate provisions by giving priority to boilerplate 
terms drafted more recently in time. Our approach moves toward viewing 
contracts as interconnected parts of a larger overall commercial network that 
ties market participants to one another. 
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